IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/arx/papers/2302.13997.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Host Community Respecting Refugee Housing

Author

Listed:
  • Duv{s}an Knop
  • v{S}imon Schierreich

Abstract

We propose a novel model for refugee housing respecting the preferences of accepting community and refugees themselves. In particular, we are given a topology representing the local community, a set of inhabitants occupying some vertices of the topology, and a set of refugees that should be housed on the empty vertices of graph. Both the inhabitants and the refugees have preferences over the structure of their neighbourhood. We are specifically interested in the problem of finding housings such that the preferences of every individual are met; using game-theoretical words, we are looking for housings that are stable with respect to some well-defined notion of stability. We investigate conditions under which the existence of equilibria is guaranteed and study the computational complexity of finding such a stable outcome. As the problem is NP-hard even in very simple settings, we employ the parameterised complexity framework to give a finer-grained view on the problem's complexity with respect to natural parameters and structural restrictions of the given topology.

Suggested Citation

  • Duv{s}an Knop & v{S}imon Schierreich, 2023. "Host Community Respecting Refugee Housing," Papers 2302.13997, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2023.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2302.13997
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://arxiv.org/pdf/2302.13997
    File Function: Latest version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mohamed Behnassi & Mahjoub El Haiba, 2022. "Implications of the Russia–Ukraine war for global food security," Nature Human Behaviour, Nature, vol. 6(6), pages 754-755, June.
    2. Ballester, Coralio, 2004. "NP-completeness in hedonic games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 1-30, October.
    3. Bogomolnaia, Anna & Jackson, Matthew O., 2002. "The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 201-230, February.
    4. Tayfun Sönmez & Suryapratim Banerjee & Hideo Konishi, 2001. "Core in a simple coalition formation game," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(1), pages 135-153.
    5. Niclas Boehmer & Edith Elkind, 2020. "Stable Roommate Problem with Diversity Preferences," Papers 2004.14640, arXiv.org.
    6. Edith Elkind & Angelo Fanelli & Michele Flammini, 2020. "Price of Pareto Optimality in hedonic games," Post-Print hal-02932135, HAL.
    7. Edith Elkind & Martin Lackner & Dominik Peters, 2022. "Preference Restrictions in Computational Social Choice: A Survey," Papers 2205.09092, arXiv.org.
    8. H. W. Lenstra, 1983. "Integer Programming with a Fixed Number of Variables," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 8(4), pages 538-548, November.
    9. José Alcalde, 1994. "Exchange-proofness or divorce-proofness? Stability in one-sided matching markets," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 1(1), pages 275-287, December.
    10. Shapley, Lloyd & Scarf, Herbert, 1974. "On cores and indivisibility," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 23-37, March.
    11. Dreze, J H & Greenberg, J, 1980. "Hedonic Coalitions: Optimality and Stability," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(4), pages 987-1003, May.
    12. Renhua Li & Leonie U Hempel & Tingbo Jiang, 2015. "A Non-Parametric Peak Calling Algorithm for DamID-Seq," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 10(3), pages 1-12, March.
    13. E. M. Fischer & S. Sippel & R. Knutti, 2021. "Increasing probability of record-shattering climate extremes," Nature Climate Change, Nature, vol. 11(8), pages 689-695, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Alcalde, Jose & Revilla, Pablo, 2004. "Researching with whom? Stability and manipulation," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(8), pages 869-887, December.
    2. Papai, Szilvia, 2004. "Unique stability in simple coalition formation games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 337-354, August.
    3. Aziz, Haris & Brandt, Felix & Harrenstein, Paul, 2013. "Pareto optimality in coalition formation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 562-581.
    4. José Alcalde & Pablo Revilla, 2001. "Tops Responsiveness, Strategy-Proofness And Coalition Formation Problems," Working Papers. Serie AD 2001-11, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    5. Niclas Boehmer & Edith Elkind, 2020. "Stable Roommate Problem with Diversity Preferences," Papers 2004.14640, arXiv.org.
    6. Sung, Shao-Chin & Dimitrov, Dinko, 2010. "Computational complexity in additive hedonic games," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 203(3), pages 635-639, June.
    7. Dinko Dimitrov & Peter Borm & Ruud Hendrickx & Shao Sung, 2006. "Simple Priorities and Core Stability in Hedonic Games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 26(2), pages 421-433, April.
    8. Sheida Etemadidavan & Andrew J. Collins, 2021. "An Empirical Distribution of the Number of Subsets in the Core Partitions of Hedonic Games," SN Operations Research Forum, Springer, vol. 2(4), pages 1-20, December.
    9. Alison Watts, 2007. "Formation of segregated and integrated groups," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 35(4), pages 505-519, April.
    10. Martin Gairing & Rahul Savani, 2019. "Computing Stable Outcomes in Symmetric Additively Separable Hedonic Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 44(3), pages 1101-1121, August.
    11. Hong, Miho & Park, Jaeok, 2022. "Core and top trading cycles in a market with indivisible goods and externalities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(C).
    12. Tayfun Sönmez & Suryapratim Banerjee & Hideo Konishi, 2001. "Core in a simple coalition formation game," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(1), pages 135-153.
    13. Francis Bloch & Effrosyni Diamantoudi, 2011. "Noncooperative formation of coalitions in hedonic games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 40(2), pages 263-280, May.
    14. Dinko Dimitrov, 2006. "Top coalitions, common rankings, and semistrict core stability," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(12), pages 1-6.
    15. Suksompong, Warut, 2015. "Individual and group stability in neutral restrictions of hedonic games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 1-5.
    16. Dimitrov, D.A. & Sung, S.C., 2004. "Enemies and Friends in Hedonic Games : Individual Deviations, Stability and Manipulation," Discussion Paper 2004-111, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    17. Karakaya, Mehmet, 2011. "Hedonic coalition formation games: A new stability notion," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 61(3), pages 157-165, May.
    18. Dinko Dimitrov & Shao Chin Sung, 2011. "Size Monotonicity and Stability of the Core in Hedonic Games," Working Papers 2011.52, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    19. Ágnes Cseh & Tamás Fleiner & Petra Harján, 2019. "Pareto Optimal Coalitions of Fixed Size," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 4(1), pages 87-108, November.
    20. Satoshi Nakada & Ryo Shirakawa, 2023. "On the unique core partition of coalition formation games: correction to İnal (2015)," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 60(3), pages 517-521, April.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2302.13997. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: arXiv administrators (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://arxiv.org/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.