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Ex-post implementation with interdependent values

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  • Saurav Goyal
  • Aroon Narayanan

Abstract

We characterize ex-post implementable allocation rules for single object auctions under quasi-linear preferences with convex interdependent value functions. We show that requiring ex-post implementability is equivalent to requiring that the allocation rule must satisfy a condition that we call eventual monotonicity (EM), which is a weakening of monotonicity, a familiar condition used to characterize dominant strategy implementation.

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  • Saurav Goyal & Aroon Narayanan, 2021. "Ex-post implementation with interdependent values," Papers 2108.09580, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2108.09580
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    File URL: http://arxiv.org/pdf/2108.09580
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bergemann, Dirk & Brooks, Benjamin & Morris, Stephen, 2020. "Countering the winner's curse: optimal auction design in a common value model," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(4), November.
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