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On Existence of Equilibrium Under Social Coalition Structures

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  • Bugra Caskurlu
  • Ozgun Ekici
  • Fatih Erdem Kizilkaya

Abstract

In a strategic form game a strategy profile is an equilibrium if no viable coalition of agents (or players) benefits (in the Pareto sense) from jointly changing their strategies. Weaker or stronger equilibrium notions can be defined by considering various restrictions on coalition formation. In a Nash equilibrium, for instance, the assumption is that viable coalitions are singletons, and in a super strong equilibrium, every coalition is viable. Restrictions on coalition formation can be justified by communication limitations, coordination problems or institutional constraints. In this paper, inspired by social structures in various real-life scenarios, we introduce certain restrictions on coalition formation, and on their basis we introduce a number of equilibrium notions. As an application we study our equilibrium notions in resource selection games (RSGs), and we present a complete set of existence and non-existence results for general RSGs and their important special cases.

Suggested Citation

  • Bugra Caskurlu & Ozgun Ekici & Fatih Erdem Kizilkaya, 2019. "On Existence of Equilibrium Under Social Coalition Structures," Papers 1910.04648, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:1910.04648
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Holzman, Ron & Law-Yone, Nissan, 1997. "Strong Equilibrium in Congestion Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 85-101, October.
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