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The method of Enestr\"om and Phragm\'en for parliamentary elections by means of approval voting

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  • Rosa Camps
  • Xavier Mora
  • Laia Saumell

Abstract

We study a method for proportional representation that was proposed at the turn from the nineteenth to the twentieth century by Gustav Enestr\"om and Edvard Phragm\'en. Like Phragm\'en's better-known iterative minimax method, it is assumed that the voters express themselves by means of approval voting. In contrast to the iterative minimax method, however, here one starts by fixing a quota, i.e. the number of votes that give the right to a seat. As a matter of fact, the method of Enestr\"om and Phragm\'en can be seen as an extension of the method of largest remainders from closed lists to open lists, or also as an adaptation of the single transferable vote to approval rather than preferential voting. The properties of this method are studied and compared with those of other methods of the same kind.

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  • Rosa Camps & Xavier Mora & Laia Saumell, 2019. "The method of Enestr\"om and Phragm\'en for parliamentary elections by means of approval voting," Papers 1907.10590, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2024.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:1907.10590
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Markus Brill & Jean-François Laslier & Piotr Skowron, 2018. "Multiwinner approval rules as apportionment methods," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 30(3), pages 358-382, July.
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