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Editors’ Introduction to JTP issue 30.3

Author

Listed:
  • Torun Dewan

    (London School of Economics & Political Science, UK)

  • John W. Patty

    (Emory University, UK)

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Torun Dewan & John W. Patty, 2018. "Editors’ Introduction to JTP issue 30.3," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 30(3), pages 269-271, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:30:y:2018:i:3:p:269-271
    DOI: 10.1177/0951629818783114
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Markus Brill & Jean-François Laslier & Piotr Skowron, 2018. "Multiwinner approval rules as apportionment methods," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 30(3), pages 358-382, July.
    2. Norman Schofield, 2003. "Valence Competition in the Spatial Stochastic Model," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 15(4), pages 371-383, October.
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