The Emergence of Leadership in Social Networks
We study a networked version of the minority game in which agents can choose to follow the choices made by a neighbouring agent in a social network. We show that for a wide variety of networks a leadership structure always emerges, with most agents following the choice made by a few agents. We find a suitable parameterisation which highlights the universal aspects of the behaviour and which also indicates where results depend on the type of social network.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Challet, Damien & Marsili, Matteo & Zhang, Yi-Cheng, 2013.
"Minority Games: Interacting agents in financial markets,"
Oxford University Press, number 9780199686698, July.
- Challet, Damien & Marsili, Matteo & Zhang, Yi-Cheng, 2004. "Minority Games: Interacting agents in financial markets," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198566403, July.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:arx:papers:1106.0296. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (arXiv administrators)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.