The Emergence of Leadership in Social Networks
We study a networked version of the minority game in which agents can choose to follow the choices made by a neighbouring agent in a social network. We show that for a wide variety of networks a leadership structure always emerges, with most agents following the choice made by a few agents. We find a suitable parameterisation which highlights the universal aspects of the behaviour and which also indicates where results depend on the type of social network.
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- Challet, Damien & Marsili, Matteo & Zhang, Yi-Cheng, 2013.
"Minority Games: Interacting agents in financial markets,"
Oxford University Press, number 9780199686698.
- Challet, Damien & Marsili, Matteo & Zhang, Yi-Cheng, 2004. "Minority Games: Interacting agents in financial markets," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198566403.
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