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Guerra Fiscal, Equilíbrio Orçamentário e Bem-Estar: os Efeitos do Imposto no Destino

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  • Marcus Lima Franco

    (UFC)

  • Paulo de Melo Jorge Neto

    (UFC)

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  • Marcus Lima Franco & Paulo de Melo Jorge Neto, 2001. "Guerra Fiscal, Equilíbrio Orçamentário e Bem-Estar: os Efeitos do Imposto no Destino," Anais do XXIX Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 29th Brazilian Economics Meeting] 025, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pós-Graduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
    • Handle: RePEc:anp:en2001:025
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Inman, Robert P. & Rubinfeld, Daniel L., 1996. "Designing tax policy in federalist economies: An overview," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(3), pages 307-334, June.
    2. Jack Mintz & Henry Tulkens, 2006. "Commodity Tax Competition Between Member States of a Federation: Equilibrium and Efficiency," Springer Books, in: Parkash Chander & Jacques Drèze & C. Knox Lovell & Jack Mintz (ed.), Public goods, environmental externalities and fiscal competition, chapter 0, pages 449-489, Springer.
    3. Roger H. Gordon, 1983. "An Optimal Taxation Approach to Fiscal Federalism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(4), pages 567-586.
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