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The Effect of Interest Group Pressure on Favorable Regulatory Decisions: The Case of Certificate-of-Need Laws

Author

Listed:
  • Stratmann, Thomas
  • Monaghan, Steven

    (Mercury Publication)

Abstract

Certificate-of-need (CON) laws currently prohibit entry or expansion of healthcare facilities in 35 states and the District of Columbia. In a lengthy process, medical providers must prove to regulators that their new services and equipment are needed. Med

Suggested Citation

  • Stratmann, Thomas & Monaghan, Steven, 2017. "The Effect of Interest Group Pressure on Favorable Regulatory Decisions: The Case of Certificate-of-Need Laws," Working Papers 05196, George Mason University, Mercatus Center.
    • Handle: RePEc:ajw:wpaper:05196
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Simpson, J.B., 1985. "State certificate-of-need programs: The current status," American Journal of Public Health, American Public Health Association, vol. 75(10), pages 1225-1229.
    2. Sloan, Frank A & Steinwald, Bruce, 1980. "Effects of Regulation on Hospital Costs and Input Use," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(1), pages 81-109, April.
    3. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
    4. Bronars, Stephen G & Lott, John R, Jr, 1997. "Do Campaign Donations Alter How a Politician Votes? Or, Do Donors Support Candidates Who Value the Same Things That They Do?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 40(2), pages 317-350, October.
    5. Paul L. Joskow, 1980. "The Effects of Competition and Regulation on Hospital Bed Supply and the Reservation Quality of the Hospital," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(2), pages 421-447, Autumn.
    6. Rui J. P. De Figueiredo & Geoff Edwards, 2007. "Does Private Money Buy Public Policy? Campaign Contributions and Regulatory Outcomes in Telecommunications," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(3), pages 547-576, September.
    7. Sloan, Frank A, 1981. "Regulation and the Rising Cost of Hospital Care," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 63(4), pages 479-487, November.
    8. Thomas Stratmann, 2005. "Some talk: Money in politics. A (partial) review of the literature," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(1), pages 135-156, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Matthew D. Mitchell, 2025. "Certificate‐of‐Need laws in healthcare: A comprehensive review of the literature," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 92(1), pages 6-43, July.
    2. Edward J. Timmons, 2025. "Symposium introduction: Is certificate‐of‐need needed?," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 92(1), pages 3-5, July.
    3. Vitor Melo & Liam Sigaud & Elijah Neilson & Markus Bjoerkheim, 2025. "Rural healthcare access and supply constraints: A causal analysis," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 92(1), pages 44-62, July.

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