Agrarumweltleistungen durch ergebnisbasierte und kollektive Vertragslösungen - Erkenntnisse aus Befragungen in Österreich und Deutschland

In this report we present the survey results from Germany and Austria on two agri-environmental measures that are not yet well established in practice in these countries, namely result-based and collective environmental protection. Farmers and stakeholders were surveyed separately. The two questionnaires per country were conducted in spring 2021 at a time when the European legal framework for the CAP after 2022 was already known. In this framework, both result-based payment and collective implementation are offered as options for agri-environmental and climate measures (AECM). At the time of the survey, the respective national arrangements of the CAP had not yet been published. Agri-environmental measures compensate farmers for environmental and climate services on a contractual basis. Farmers will only decide to participate on a voluntary basis if the measures are attractive to them. Within the framework of Agri-environmental measures compensate farmers for environmental and climate services on a contractual basis. However, farmers will only decide to participate on a voluntary basis if the measures are attractive to them. In order to find out which contractual characteristics positively influence the willingness to participate in the two types of contracts examined here, farmers in Austria and in Germany were surveyed online. In addition, the opinions on the practicability and economic efficiency of the result-based and collective contracts were surveyed. A total of 152 surveys from Austria and 146 from Germany were analysed. Since a large number of stakeholders are involved in the conception, implementation and/or monitoring of AECM, stakeholders in Austria and Germany were also interviewed in writing. Stakeholders were also asked to indicate which external factors, beyond the control of the farmers themselves, they believe inhibit or encourage participation in result-based or collective contracts. For this purpose, the PESTLE2 approach, originally developed for strategic business decisions, was adapted to this question. In this way, it was possible to explore in detail which political, economic, social, technological, legal and environmental factors play a role in result-based or collective contracts. 34 questionnaires from stakeholders in Austria and 51 from Germany were analysed. Both Austrian and German farmers prefer the result-based contract type for future participation over other new types of contracts such as collective, value chain-oriented contracts and land leases with environmental requirements. Specific contract characteristics are of crucial importance here. The proportion of farmers who indicated that they were likely or very likely to participate in result-based contracts was significantly higher than for the collective contract. The result-based contract was also rated better than the collective contract in terms of practical feasibility and economic efficiency by farmers as well as stakeholders from both countries. There are differences in the countries especially in the assessment of the Austrian stakeholders regarding the practical feasibility of the collective contract. There was particularly little agreement here. In both countries, stakeholders rate the economic efficiency of collective agreements significantly higher than farmers. Environmental aspects that stakeholders and farmers say can be improved well with a result-based contract type are "biodiversity" and "landscape and scenery", but "soil quality" was also mentioned relatively often. In collective contracts, all parties mentioned "landscape and scenery" most frequently, followed by "biodiversity". Moreover, German stakeholders can well imagine that collective contracts are suitable for improving "water quality". In terms of the external factors that the stakeholders surveyed believe to influence farmers' adoption and participation in result-based and collective contracts, the responses cover a wide range of hindering and facilitating factors. For result-based contracts, economic factors were most frequently mentioned, especially a comprehensible premium calculation as well as adequate financial remuneration; for collective approaches, it was social factors. The calculation of premiums in result-based contracts was considered difficult, as environmental results are not always immediately visible or attributable to individual farmers. In addition, (extreme) weather events can affect environmental outcomes, putting payments to farmers at risk. To overcome such difficulties, combinations of basic payments and additional performance payments or staggered payments for reaching intermediate targets have been proposed. In collective approaches, a positive group dynamic is seen as crucial for success. "Together" and "we-feeling" were mentioned as core prerequisites for a good functioning. Trust within the group of farmers as well as with the authorities and other actors involved is also seen as conducive. As a major obstacle to collective approaches, several participants mentioned the additional coordination and communication effort that requires adequate funding. Clear rules and a clearly defined distribution of tasks were also emphasised, among other things to avoid free-rider behaviour. In summary, the comparative examination of the attitudes and opinions of German and Austrian farmers made it possible to identify contract-specific commonalities and differences between the two countries. Differences become apparent, inter alia, in the future willingness to participate and the assessment of the suitability of result-based or collective contracts for the protection of selected environmental goods.