IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ags/iprwps/294679.html

Ownership and Incentives In a Transition Economy

Author

Listed:
  • Tirole, Jean

Abstract

The process of transition of reforming socialist economies to market economies has several alternative paths. Seven adjustment scenarios are evaluated: public ownership; employee management under absentee state ownership; entrepreneurship; diffuse private ownership; hands-on domestic private ownership; hands-on foreign ownership; and scrappage. Two phases are likely to characterize the Eastern European environment: an initial noisy phase, followed by a more mature phase. Two key features of the transition process are the unusually high level of uncertainty in the firms's environment and the non stationarity in its level. Five implications are developed: 1) stock markets will work poorly in the noisy phase; 2) most competition-oriented restructuring ought to take place before privatization; 3) the threat of capture of government decision making by interest groups is, during the transition period, more serious in Eastern Europe than in Western economies; 4) the main attraction of foreign aid for the transition process may not be expertise, but rather commitment and independence from interest groups; and 5) the stock market must be appropriately introduced at the beginning of the mature phase.

Suggested Citation

  • Tirole, Jean, 1991. "Ownership and Incentives In a Transition Economy," Institute for Policy Reform Working Paper Series 294679, Institute for Policy Reform.
  • Handle: RePEc:ags:iprwps:294679
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.294679
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/294679/files/ipr032.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.22004/ag.econ.294679?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Oliver Hart & Jean Tirole, 1990. "Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 21(1990 Micr), pages 205-286.
    2. Tom K. Lee, 1982. "Resource Information Policy and Federal Resource Leasing," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 561-568, Autumn.
    3. Philippe Aghion & Peter Howitt, 1994. "Growth and Unemployment," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 61(3), pages 477-494.
    4. Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, 1980. "Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(1), pages 42-64, Spring.
    5. Holmstrom, Bengt R. & Tirole, Jean, 1989. "The theory of the firm," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 2, pages 61-133, Elsevier.
    6. Zbigniew M Fallenbuchl, 1991. "Polish Privatization Policy," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 33(2), pages 53-70, July.
    7. Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, 1990. "Relative Performance Evaluation for Chief Executive Officers," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 43(3), pages 30, April.
    8. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 614-641, June.
    9. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1988. "Repeated Auctions of Incentive Contracts, Investment, and Bidding Parity with an Application to Takeovers," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(4), pages 516-537, Winter.
    10. Fischer, S., 1991. "Privatization in East European Tranformation," Working papers 578, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    11. George A. Akerlof & Andrew K. Rose & Janet L. Yellen & Helga Hessenius, 1991. "East Germany in from the Cold: The Economic Aftermath of Currency Union," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 22(1), pages 1-106.
    12. Douglas W. Diamond, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414.
    13. Milgrom, Paul R, 1981. "Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(4), pages 921-943, June.
    14. David Lipton & Jeffrey Sachs, 1990. "Privitization in Eastern Europe: The Case of Poland," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 21(2), pages 293-342.
    15. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
    16. Jensen, Michael C, 1988. "Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 2(1), pages 21-48, Winter.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Tirole, Jean, 1991. "Ownership and Incentives In a Transition Economy," Institute for Policy Reform Archive 294679, Institute for Policy Reform.
    2. Jean Tirole, 1991. "Privatization in Eastern Europe: Incentives and the Economics of Transition," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1991, Volume 6, pages 221-268, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Holmstrom, Bengt R. & Tirole, Jean, 1989. "The theory of the firm," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 2, pages 61-133, Elsevier.
    4. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-783, June.
    5. Rudolf Kerschbamer, 1998. "Disciplinary Takeovers and Industry Effects," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(2), pages 265-306, June.
    6. Lin, Justin Yifu & Sun, Xifang & Jiang, Ye, 2009. "Toward a theory of optimal financial structure," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5038, The World Bank.
    7. Becht, Marco & Bolton, Patrick & Roell, Ailsa, 2003. "Corporate governance and control," Handbook of the Economics of Finance, in: G.M. Constantinides & M. Harris & R. M. Stulz (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Finance, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 1, pages 1-109, Elsevier.
    8. repec:eee:labchp:v:3:y:1999:i:pb:p:2373-2437 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Mishkin, Frederic S, 1994. "Preventing Financial Crises: An International Perspective," The Manchester School of Economic & Social Studies, University of Manchester, vol. 62(0), pages 1-40, Suppl..
    10. Oliver E. Williamson, 2002. "The Theory of the Firm as Governance Structure: From Choice to Contract," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(3), pages 171-195, Summer.
    11. Gary Gorton & Matthias Kahl, 1999. "Blockholder Identity, Equity Ownership Structures and Hostile Takeovers," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 99-19, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
    12. Czarnitzki, Dirk & Kraft, Kornelius, 2009. "Capital control, debt financing and innovative activity," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 372-383, August.
    13. Marcel Canoy & Machiel van Dijk & Jan Lemmen & Ruud de Mooij & Jürgen Weigand, 2001. "Competition and stability in banking," CPB Document 15.rdf, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
    14. Belleflamme,Paul & Peitz,Martin, 2015. "Industrial Organization," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107069978, January.
    15. Nenova, Tatiana, 2006. "Takeover laws and financial development," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4029, The World Bank.
    16. Janvier D. Nkurunziza, 2005. "Reputation and Credit without Collateral in Africa`s Formal Banking," Economics Series Working Papers WPS/2005-02, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    17. Heinrich, Ralph P., 1999. "Complementarities in Corporate Governance - A Survey of the Literature with Special Emphasis on Japan," Kiel Working Papers 947, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
    18. Dionne, G. & Doherty, N., 1991. "Adverse Selection In Insurance Markets: A Selective Survey," Cahiers de recherche 9105, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    19. Ke, Bin & Petroni, Kathy & Safieddine, Assem, 1999. "Ownership concentration and sensitivity of executive pay to accounting performance measures: Evidence from publicly and privately-held insurance companies," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 185-209, December.
    20. Demirguc-Kunt, Asli, 1992. "Developing country capital structures and emerging stock markets," Policy Research Working Paper Series 933, The World Bank.
    21. Goergen, Marc & Manjon, Miguel C. & Renneboog, Luc, 2008. "Recent developments in German corporate governance," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 175-193, September.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:iprwps:294679. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: AgEcon Search (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.