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Trading off Use Restrictions and Benefit-Sharing for Genetic Materials for Food and Agriculture with an Emphasis on Upfront Payments


  • Seyoum, Aseffa
  • Welch, Eric W.


This study investigates the tradeoffs that providers of genetic resources make between constructing a benefits arrangement and establishing use restrictions. The analysis makes use of project level data collected from university and government researchers in the US. Results show that when transfers require upfront payments recipients are not expected to contribute long-term monetary or non-monetary benefits, and nor are there restrictions on the transferred material. When providers seek information from project results they tend not to request upfront payments for providing genetic materials. Researchers tend to acquire genetic material at cost plus an additional fee when it comes from foreign counties and companies. The paper concludes by highlighting the roles that upfront payments and reduced restriction can play to improve exchange and utilization of genetic materials for public research.

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  • Seyoum, Aseffa & Welch, Eric W., 2013. "Trading off Use Restrictions and Benefit-Sharing for Genetic Materials for Food and Agriculture with an Emphasis on Upfront Payments," 53rd Annual Conference, Berlin, Germany, September 25-27, 2013 156128, German Association of Agricultural Economists (GEWISOLA).
  • Handle: RePEc:ags:gewi13:156128

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Welch, Eric W. & Shin, Eunjung & Long, Jennifer, 2013. "Potential effects of the Nagoya Protocol on the exchange of non-plant genetic resources for scientific research: Actors, paths, and consequences," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 136-147.
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    Upfront payment; benefit sharing; genetic resource; material exchange; use restriction; Agricultural and Food Policy;

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