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Anreizorientierte Entlohnung In Bezugsgenossenschaften: Eine Theoretische Analyse Einer Leistungsorientierten Entlohnung Zur Maximierung Des Monetären Mitgliedernutzens

  • Zieseniss, Roland
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    Bezugsgenossenschaften weisen durch das Verhältnis zu ihren Eigentümern, welche gleichzeitig Kunden des Unternehmens sind, erhebliche Unterschiede zu anderen Unternehmenstypen auf. Eine Entlohnung der genossenschaftlichen Unternehmensleitung sollte diese Besonderheit berücksichtigen. Dieser Beitrag diskutiert verschiedene Vergütungssysteme zur Steuerung der Unternehmensleitung in Genossenschaften. Dabei wird eine neu entwickelte genossenschaftsspezifische Vergütung mit einer Fixentlohnung und einer Entlohnung auf Basis des Genossenschaftsgewinns für eine Bezugsgenossenschaft verglichen.

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    File URL: http://purl.umn.edu/137177
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    Paper provided by German Association of Agricultural Economists (GEWISOLA) in its series 52nd Annual Conference, Stuttgart, Germany, September 26-28, 2012 with number 137177.

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    Date of creation: 2012
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    Handle: RePEc:ags:gewi12:137177
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    1. Richards, Timothy J. & Klein, Kurt K. & Walburger, Allan M., 1998. "Principal-Agent Relationships in Agricultural Cooperatives: An Empirical Analysis from Rural Alberta," Journal of Cooperatives, NCERA-210, vol. 13.
    2. Brent Hueth & Philippe Marcoul, 2009. "Incentive Pay for CEOs in Cooperative Firms," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1218-1223.
    3. Kramer, Jost W., 2007. "Erfolgsaspekte genossenschaftlichen Wirtschaftens aus betriebswirtschaftlicher Perspektive," Wismar Discussion Papers 14/2007, Hochschule Wismar, Wismar Business School.
    4. Murphy, Kevin J., 1999. "Executive compensation," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 38, pages 2485-2563 Elsevier.
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