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The Role of the Courts in Environmental Property Rights Disputes: An Empirical Analysis of U.S. Army Corps of Enigneer Dams

Author

Listed:
  • Ottenheimer, William
  • Brady, Michael
  • Yoder, Jonathan
  • Rajagopalan, Kirti

Abstract

Federally managed dams are designated specific purposes in the legislation associated with their construction. Dams constructed and managed by the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers are typically focused on transportation and flood control, although they can have multiple other purposes including water supply for agriculture, hydroelectric power generation, and recreation. These purposes are often competing and some of them were added post construction. The competition of mutually exclusive resource allocation endeavors creates conflicts which can escalate to claims against the federal government. This research assesses the development of federally managed water resource conflicts over the past 80 years through legal proceedings. A hazard regression and count data model regression test a hypothesis that an increase in the number of objectives managed for increases litigation risk for water management agencies. This research informs an implication of multi-objective environmental management in a time of increasing responsiveness to special interests.

Suggested Citation

  • Ottenheimer, William & Brady, Michael & Yoder, Jonathan & Rajagopalan, Kirti, 2025. "The Role of the Courts in Environmental Property Rights Disputes: An Empirical Analysis of U.S. Army Corps of Enigneer Dams," 2025 AAEA & WAEA Joint Annual Meeting, July 27-29, 2025, Denver, CO 360753, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea25:360753
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.360753
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August.
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