IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ags/aaea19/291224.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Lessons from local governance and collective action efforts to manage irrigation withdrawals in Kansas

Author

Listed:
  • Perez-Quesada, Gabriela
  • Hendricks, Nathan P.

Abstract

This study evaluates four groundwater management plans to increase the understanding of how local governance and collective action can be effectively implemented to manage irrigation withdrawals in Kansas. The results of our analysis demonstrate five key lessons that highlight the challenges of collective action efforts to manage common-pool resources in a developed country setting. First, the four management plans generally follow Ostrom’s design principles for collective action. However, there are important areas—particularly boundaries and allocations definition—where the management plans could be improved to better align with Ostrom’s design principles. Second, a majority of farmers agree that action is needed to reduce the rate of aquifer depletion but management plans have not substantially reduced water use. Third, management plans that allow for voluntary participation have not received more support than those that require mandatory compliance, perhaps due to the classic free-rider problem. Fourth, there is no clear evidence that heterogeneous benefits from management explain support within a management area. Fifth, groundwater users generally perceive that they have an acceptable level of information. Our analysis highlights the significant challenges facing successful collective action efforts to manage water in the USA. and that the efforts are most likely to be successful when they are small-scale, mandatory, and involve users in the formation process.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Perez-Quesada, Gabriela & Hendricks, Nathan P., 2019. "Lessons from local governance and collective action efforts to manage irrigation withdrawals in Kansas," 2019 Annual Meeting, July 21-23, Atlanta, Georgia 291224, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
  • Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea19:291224
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.291224
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/291224/files/Abstracts_19_05_14_22_37_10_07__129_130_18_192_0.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.22004/ag.econ.291224?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Steven M. Smith & Krister Andersson & Kelsey C. Cody & Michael Cox & Darren Ficklin, 2017. "Responding to a Groundwater Crisis: The Effects of Self-Imposed Economic Incentives," Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, University of Chicago Press, vol. 4(4), pages 985-1023.
    2. Christian A. Vossler & Maurice Doyon & Daniel Rondeau, 2012. "Truth in Consequentiality: Theory and Field Evidence on Discrete Choice Experiments," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(4), pages 145-171, November.
    3. Drysdale, Krystal M. & Hendricks, Nathan P., 2018. "Adaptation to an irrigation water restriction imposed through local governance," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 150-165.
    4. Ayres, Andrew B. & Edwards, Eric C. & Libecap, Gary D., 2018. "How transaction costs obstruct collective action: The case of California's groundwater," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 46-65.
    5. Steward, David R. & Allen, Andrew J., 2016. "Peak groundwater depletion in the High Plains Aquifer, projections from 1930 to 2110," Agricultural Water Management, Elsevier, vol. 170(C), pages 36-48.
    6. Eric C. Edwards, 2016. "What Lies Beneath? Aquifer Heterogeneity and the Economics of Groundwater Management," Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, University of Chicago Press, vol. 3(2), pages 453-491.
    7. James J. Butler & Donald O. Whittemore & B. Brownie Wilson & Geoffrey C. Bohling, 2018. "Sustainability of aquifers supporting irrigated agriculture: a case study of the High Plains aquifer in Kansas," Water International, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 43(6), pages 815-828, August.
    8. Steven M. Smith, 2016. "Common Property Resources and New Entrants: Uncovering the Bias and Effects of New Users," Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, University of Chicago Press, vol. 3(1), pages 1-36.
    9. D’Agostino, D. & Borg, M. & Hallett, S.H. & Sakrabani, R.S. & Thompson, A. & Papadimitriou, L. & Knox, J.W., 2020. "Multi-stakeholder analysis to improve agricultural water management policy and practice in Malta," Agricultural Water Management, Elsevier, vol. 229(C).
    10. Ostrom, Elinor, 2002. "Common-pool resources and institutions: Toward a revised theory," Handbook of Agricultural Economics, in: B. L. Gardner & G. C. Rausser (ed.), Handbook of Agricultural Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 24, pages 1315-1339, Elsevier.
    11. Guerrero, Bridget L. & Amosson, Stephen H. & Almas, Lal K., 2008. "Integrating Stakeholder Input into Water Policy Development and Analysis," Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, Southern Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 40(2), pages 1-7, August.
    12. Guerrero, Bridget & Amosson, Steve & Almas, Lal, 2008. "Integrating Stakeholder Input into Water Policy Development and Analysis," Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 40(2), pages 465-471, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Luo, Yaping & Wu, Jianxian & Xu, Ying, 2022. "Can self-governance tackle the water commons? — Causal evidence of the effect of rural water pollution treatment on farmers' health in China," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
    2. Prasenjit N. Ghosh & Ruiqing Miao & Emir Malikov, 2023. "Crop insurance premium subsidy and irrigation water withdrawals in the western United States," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 48(4), pages 968-992, October.
    3. Lee, Juhee & Hendricks, Nathan, 2022. "Irrigation Decisions in Response to Groundwater Salinity in Kansas," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 47(3), September.
    4. Liangzhen Zang & Yahua Wang & Yiqing Su, 2021. "Does Farmland Scale Management Promote Rural Collective Action? An Empirical Study of Canal Irrigation Systems in China," Land, MDPI, vol. 10(11), pages 1-25, November.
    5. R. Aaron Hrozencik & Jordan F. Suter & Paul J. Ferraro & Nathan Hendricks, 2024. "Social comparisons and groundwater use: Evidence from Colorado and Kansas," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 106(2), pages 946-966, March.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Eric C. Edwards & Todd Guilfoos, 2021. "The Economics of Groundwater Governance Institutions across the Globe," Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 43(4), pages 1571-1594, December.
    2. Ellen M. Bruno & Nick Hagerty & Arthur R. Wardle, 2022. "The Political Economy of Groundwater Management: Descriptive Evidence from California," NBER Chapters, in: American Agriculture, Water Resources, and Climate Change, pages 343-365, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. R. Aaron Hrozencik & Jordan F. Suter & Paul J. Ferraro & Nathan Hendricks, 2024. "Social comparisons and groundwater use: Evidence from Colorado and Kansas," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 106(2), pages 946-966, March.
    4. Rouhi Rad, Mani & Brozović, Nicholas & Foster, Timothy & Mieno, Taro, 2020. "Effects of instantaneous groundwater availability on irrigated agriculture and implications for aquifer management," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(C).
    5. Dietrich Earnhart & Nathan P. Hendricks, 2023. "Adapting to water restrictions: Intensive versus extensive adaptation over time differentiated by water right seniority," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 105(5), pages 1458-1490, October.
    6. Ayres, Andrew B. & Edwards, Eric C. & Libecap, Gary D., 2018. "How transaction costs obstruct collective action: The case of California's groundwater," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 46-65.
    7. Drysdale, Krystal M. & Hendricks, Nathan P., 2018. "Adaptation to an irrigation water restriction imposed through local governance," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 150-165.
    8. Godwin Kwabla Ekpe & Anna A. Klis, 2023. "Spillover Effects in Irrigated Agriculture from the Groundwater Commons," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 86(3), pages 469-507, November.
    9. Smith, Steven M., 2018. "Economic incentives and conservation: Crowding-in social norms in a groundwater commons," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 147-174.
    10. Quérou, Nicolas & Tomini, Agnes & Costello, Christopher, 2022. "Limited‐tenure concessions for collective goods," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 143(C).
    11. Bruno, Ellen M. & Jessoe, Katrina K. & Hanemann, Michael, 2023. "The Dynamic Impacts of Pricing Groundwater," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt2mx8q1td, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
    12. Ellen M. Bruno & Richard J. Sexton, 2020. "The Gains from Agricultural Groundwater Trade and the Potential for Market Power: Theory and Application," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 102(3), pages 884-910, May.
    13. Bruno, Ellen M. & Jessoe, Katrina, 2021. "Missing markets: Evidence on agricultural groundwater demand from volumetric pricing," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 196(C).
    14. Bruno, Ellen Marie & Hagerty, Nick, 2023. "Anticipatory Effects of Regulation in Open Access," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt58n467v5, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
    15. Caleb M. Koch & Heinrich H. Nax, 2022. "Groundwater Usage and Strategic Complements: Part I (Instrumental Variables)," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(5), pages 1-19, October.
    16. Vallury, Sechindra & Abbott, Joshua K. & Shin, Hoon C. & Anderies, John M., 2020. "Sustaining Coupled Irrigation Infrastructures: Multiple Instruments for Multiple Dilemmas," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 178(C).
    17. Haacker, Erin M.K. & Cotterman, Kayla A. & Smidt, Samuel J. & Kendall, Anthony D. & Hyndman, David W., 2019. "Effects of management areas, drought, and commodity prices on groundwater decline patterns across the High Plains Aquifer," Agricultural Water Management, Elsevier, vol. 218(C), pages 259-273.
    18. Xiangwen Kong & Chengyan Yue & Eric Watkins & Mike Barnes & Yufeng Lai, 2023. "Investigating the Effectiveness of Irrigation Restriction Length on Water Use Behavior," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 37(1), pages 251-268, January.
    19. Manning, Dale T. & Rad, Mani Rouhi & Suter, Jordan F. & Goemans, Christopher & Xiang, Zaichen & Bailey, Ryan, 2020. "Non-market valuation in integrated assessment modeling: The benefits of water right retirement," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 103(C).
    20. Louis Sears & David Lim & C.-Y. Cynthia Lin Lawell, 2018. "The Economics of Agricultural Groundwater Management Institutions: The Case of California," Water Economics and Policy (WEP), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 4(03), pages 1-21, July.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Resource/ Energy Economics and Policy;

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:aaea19:291224. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: AgEcon Search (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/aaeaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.