An Experimental Examination Of Common Agency
An equilibrium solution is developed for a common-agency game that is used to study the structure of regulatory bureaucracy. Contrary to existing results, this equilibrium maintains powerful incentives for the agent. An experiment is conducted to test the competing hypotheses. The implications of common-agency on reciprocity are also examined.
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SFB 373 Discussion Papers
1999,82, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
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