Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

2003

• Coble, Keith H. & Hanson, Terrill R. & Miller, J. Corey & Shaik, Saleem, 2003, "Agricultural Insurance as an Environmental Policy Tool," Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, Southern Agricultural Economics Association, volume 35, issue 2, pages 1-15, August, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.43214.
• Coble, Keith H. & Hanson, Terry & Miller, J. Corey & Shaik, Saleem, 2003, "Agricultural Insurance as an Environmental Policy Tool," Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, Cambridge University Press, volume 35, issue 2, pages 391-405, August.
• Feess, Eberhard & Hege, Ulrich, 2003, "Safety monitoring, capital structure, and "financial responsibility"," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, volume 23, issue 3, pages 323-339, September.
• Ulrich Hege & Eberhard Feess, 2003, "Safety monitoring, capital structure, and "financial responsibility"," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-00459915, Sep, DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2003.09.008.
• Glaeser, Edward Ludwig & Shleifer, Andrei, 2003, "The Rise of the Regulatory State," Scholarly Articles, Harvard University Department of Economics, number 30747197.
• González, Patrick, 2003, "Optimal Assignment of Liabilities," Cahiers de recherche, Université Laval - Département d'économique, number 0305.
• González, Patrick, 2003, "Optimal Assignment of Liabilities," Cahiers de recherche, GREEN, number 0305.
• Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2003, "Found Money? Split-Award Statutes and Settlement of Punitive Damages Cases," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, volume 5, issue 1, pages 134-164.
• Juan José Ganuza & Fernando Gómez, 2003, "Optimal negligence rule under limited liability," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 759, Mar, revised May 2004.
• Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2003, "Secrecy and Safety," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics, number 0317, Aug, revised Sep 2003.

2002

• Kern Alexander, 2002, "Lessons from the rise of the US limited liability partnership," Working Papers, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge, number wp255, Dec.
• Ram Singh, 2002, "Causation, Economic Efficiency and the Law of Torts," Working papers, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics, number 102, Jun.
• Ram Singh, 2002, "Characterization of Efficient Product Liability Rules: When Consumers are Imperfectly Informed," Working papers, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics, number 110, Dec.
• Marcel Boyer & Donatella Porrini, 2002, "Modeling the Choice Between Regulation and Liability in Terms of Social Welfare," CIRANO Working Papers, CIRANO, number 2002s-13, Feb.
• Iljoong Kim, 2002, "An Information Saving and Efficient Nuisance Rule," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, volume 158, issue 3, pages 514-527, September.
• Raymond J. Ballard & Dale R. Funderburk, 2002, "Punitive Damages and the Optimal Level of Product Failure," Journal of Economic Insight, Missouri Valley Economic Association, volume 28, issue 1, pages 67-78.
• Steven Shavell, 2002, "Minimum Asset Requirements," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 9335, Nov.
• Peter Diamond, 2002, "Integrating Punishment and Efficiency Concerns in Punitive Damages for Reckless Disregard of Risks to Others," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, volume 18, issue 1, pages 117-139, April.
• Ulrich Hege & Eberhard Feess, 2002, "original papers : Safety regulation and monitor liability," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 7, issue 2, pages 173-185.
• Anna Alberini & David Austin, 2002, "Accidents Waiting to Happen: Liability Policy and Toxic Pollution Releases," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, volume 84, issue 4, pages 729-741, November.
• Juan José Ganuza & Fernando Gómez, 2002, "Caution, children crossing: Heterogeneity of victim's cost of care and negligence rule," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 666, Dec.

2001

• Tracy R. Lewis & David E. M. Sappington, 2001, "How Liable Should a Lender Be? The Case of Judgment-Proof Firms and Environmental Risk: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 91, issue 3, pages 724-730, June.
• Dieter Balkenborg, 2001, "How Liable Should a Lender Be? The Case of Judgment-Proof Firms and Environmental Risk: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 91, issue 3, pages 731-738, June.
• Rohan Pitchford, 2001, "How Liable Should a Lender Be? The Case of Judgment-Proof Firms and Environmental Risk: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 91, issue 3, pages 739-745, June.
• Alberini, Anna & Austin, David H., 2001, "Accidents Waiting to Happen: Liability Policy and Toxic Pollution Releases," Discussion Papers, Resources for the Future, number 10518, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.10518.
• Dharmapala, Dhammika & Hoffmann, Sandra A. & Schwartz, Warren, 2001, "A Neglected Interdependency in Liability Theory," Discussion Papers, Resources for the Future, number 10626, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.10626.
• Boyd, James, 2001, "Financial Responsibility for Environmental Obligations: Are Bonding and Assurance Rules Fulfilling Their Promise?," Discussion Papers, Resources for the Future, number 10809, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.10809.
• Folmer, Henk & Heijman, Wim J.M. & Leen, Auke R., 2001, "Product liability: the normative Austrian perspective," Mansholt Working Papers, Wageningen University, Mansholt Graduate School of Social Sciences, number 43020, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.43020.
• Ram Singh, 2001, "Effects of Courts' Errors on Efficiency of Liability Rules: When Individuals are Imperfectly Informed," Working papers, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics, number 97, Sep.
• Ram Singh, 2001, "Efficient Liability Rules When Courts Make Errors in Estimation of the Harm : Complete Characterization," Working papers, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics, number 99, Nov.
• Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, 2001, "The Rise of the Regulatory State," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research, number 1934.
• Donatella Porrini, 2001, "Regolazione ex ante, regolazione ex post e auto-regolazione: il caso ambientale," LIUC Papers in Ethics, Law and Economics, Cattaneo University (LIUC), number 93, Oct.
• Mingli Zheng, 2001, "Liability Rules and Evolutionary Dynamics," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, volume 157, issue 4, pages 520-535, December.
• Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, 2001, "The Rise of the Regulatory State," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 8650, Dec.
• Jeffrey R. Kling & Alan B. Krueger, 2001, "Cost, Benefits and Distributional Consequences of Inmate Labor," Working Papers, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section., number 828, Jan.
• Austin, David & Alberini, Anna, 2001, "Accidents Waiting to Happen: Liability Policy and Toxic Pollution Releases," RFF Working Paper Series, Resources for the Future, number dp-01-06, Apr.
• Hoffmann, Sandra & Schwartz, Warren & Dharmapala, Dhammika, 2001, "A Neglected Interdependency in Liability Theory," RFF Working Paper Series, Resources for the Future, number dp-01-13, Jul.
• Boyd, James, 2001, "Financial Responsibility for Environmental Obligations: Are Bonding and Assurance Rules Fulfilling Their Promise?," RFF Working Paper Series, Resources for the Future, number dp-01-42, Aug.
• Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, 2001, "Do Exposure Suits Produce a 'Race to File'? An Economic Analysis of a Tort for Risk," Working papers, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics, number 2002-42, Oct, revised Jun 2004.
• Nell, Martin & Richter, Andreas, 2001, "The design of liability rules for highly risky activities: Is strict liability the better solution?," Working Papers on Risk and Insurance, University of Hamburg, Institute for Risk and Insurance, number 1.

2000

• Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000, "On the joint use of liability and safety regulation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, volume 20, issue 3, pages 371-382, September.
• Schmitz, P. W., 2000, "Erratum to 'On the Joint Use of Liability and Safety Regulation': [International Review of Law and Economics (2000), 20, 371-382]," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, volume 20, issue 4, pages 575-575, December.
• McKitrick, R., 2000, "Contests for Pricing Externalities with Free Entry of Injurers and Victims," Working Papers, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance, number 2000-3.
• Monzer Kahf, 2000, "Economics Of Liability: An Islamic View," IIUM Journal of Economics and Management, IIUM Journal of Economis and Management, volume 8, issue 2, pages 85-108, December.
• Thomas J. Kniesner & John D. Leeth, 2000, "Workplace Safety Policy: Past, Present, and Future," Center for Policy Research Reports, Center for Policy Research, Maxwell School, Syracuse University, number 19, Oct.
• Edgar Gracia López, 2000, "Bolivar y su perspectiva ética Patterns in Neighboring Areas Colombia," Lúmina. Revista iberoamericana de Contabilidad, Administración y Economía, Facultad de Ciencias Contables, Económicas y Administrativas, Universidad de Manizales., volume 0, issue 3, pages 117-125, Diciembre.
• Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000, "On the Joint Use of Liability and Safety Regulation," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 12536.
• Feess, E. & Hege, U., 2000, "Safety Monitoring, Capital Structure, and "Financial Responsibility"," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 2000-33.
• Feess, E. & Hege, U., 2000, "Safety Monitoring, Capital Structure, and "Financial Responsibility"," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number 3705f485-8463-48c7-a622-3.
• Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2000, "Found Money? Split-Award Statutes and Settlement of Punitive Damages Cases," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics, number 0001, Jan, revised Mar 2001.

1999

• Robert Thornton & John Ward, 1999, "The Economist in Tort Litigation," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, volume 13, issue 2, pages 101-112, Spring.
• Alberini, Anna & Austin, David H., 1999, "Accidents Waiting to Happen: Liability Policy and Toxic Pollution Releases," Discussion Papers, Resources for the Future, number 10450, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.10450.
• Bulow, Jeremy I. & Klemperer, Paul, 1999, "The Tobacco Deal," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 2125, Apr.
• Sieg, Holger, 1999, "Estimating a Bargaining Model with Asymmetric Information: Evidence from Medical Malpractice Disputes," Working Papers, Duke University, Department of Economics, number 99-02.
• Demougin, Dominique & Fluet, Claude, 1999, "A further justification for the negligence rule," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, volume 19, issue 1, pages 33-45, March.
• Bolin, Kristian, 1999, "The Ownership Of Funds And Systems For Reparation Of Very Large Accidents," Working Papers, Lund University, Department of Economics, number 1999:006, Sep.
• Aaron S. Edlin, 1999, "Per-Mile Premiums for Auto Insurance," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 6934, Feb.
• Austin, David & Alberini, Anna, 1999, "Accidents Waiting to Happen: Liability Policy and Toxic Pollution Releases," RFF Working Paper Series, Resources for the Future, number dp-99-29, Mar.
• Claude Fluet, 1999, "Régulation des risques et insolvabilité : le rôle de la responsabilité pour faute en information imparfaite," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, volume 75, issue 1, pages 379-399.
• Aaron S. Edlin., 1999, "Per-Mile Premiums for Auto Insurance," Economics Working Papers, University of California at Berkeley, number 99-262, Jan.
• Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, 1999, "The Tobacco Deal," HEW, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9904002, Apr.
• Aaron S. Edlin, 1999, "Per-Mile Premiums for Auto Insurance," Law and Economics, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9902002, Feb.
• Eckardt, Martina, 1999, "The Evolution of the German Tort Law in the 19th Century - An Economic Analysis of the Evolution of Law," Thuenen-Series of Applied Economic Theory, University of Rostock, Institute of Economics, number 23.

1998

• Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, 1998, "The Tobacco Deal," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, volume 29, issue 1998 Micr, pages 323-394.
• Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 1998, "A Further Justification for the Negligence Rule," Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques, number 9801, Nov.
• Claude Fluet, 1998, "Régulation des risques et insolvabilité: le rôle de la responsabilité pour faute en information imparfaite," Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques, number 9802, Nov.