The Economic Theory of Gift-Giving: Perfect Substitutability of Transfers and Redistribution of Wealth
In: Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity
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Cited by:
- Principe, Kristine E. & Eisenhauer, Joseph G., 2009. "Gift-giving and deadweight loss," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 215-220, March.
- Kaplan, Todd R. & Ruffle, Bradley J., 2009. "In search of welfare-improving gifts," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(4), pages 445-460, May.
- Deffains, Bruno & Mercier Ythier, Jean, 2010. "Optimal production of transplant care services," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(9-10), pages 638-653, October.
- Bruno Deffains & Jean Mercier Ythier, 2009. "Optimal production of transplant care services," Working Papers of BETA 2009-19, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
- Laura Birg & Anna Goeddeke, 2016.
"Christmas Economics—A Sleigh Ride,"
Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 54(4), pages 1980-1984, October.
- Birg, Laura & Goeddeke, Anna, 2014. "Christmas economics: A sleigh ride," Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research Discussion Papers 220, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
- Buchholz, Wolfgang & Cornes, Richard & Peters, Wolfgang & Rübbelke, Dirk, 2015.
"Pareto improvement through unilateral matching of public good contributions: The role of commitment,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 9-12.
- Wolfgang Buchholz & Richard Cornes & Wolfgang Peters & Dirk Rübbelke, 2014. "Pareto Improvement through Unilateral Matching of Public Good Contributions: The Role of Commitment," CESifo Working Paper Series 4863, CESifo.
- Jean Mercier-Ythier, 2010. "The Aggregation of Individual Distributive Preferences through the Distributive Liberal Social Contract : Normative Analysis," Working Papers of BETA 2010-01, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
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JEL classification:
- Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification
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