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YU ZHOU, Sr.

Personal Details

First Name:Yu
Middle Name:
Last Name:Zhou
Suffix:Sr.
RePEc Short-ID:pzh877
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
https://sites.google.com/site/yuzhouosaka/home

Affiliation

Graduate School of Economics
Kyoto University

Kyoto, Japan
https://www.econ.kyoto-u.ac.jp/
RePEc:edi:fekyojp (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. William PHAN & Ryan TIERNEY & Yu ZHOU, 2021. "Crowding in School Choice," Discussion papers e-21-006, Graduate School of Economics , Kyoto University.
  2. Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Zhou, Yu, 2019. "Competitive Equilibria in Matching Models with Financial Constraints," Research Memorandum 007, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
  3. Yu Zhou & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2019. "Minimum price equilibrium in the assignment market," ISER Discussion Paper 1047, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  4. Yu Zhou & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2016. "Strategy-Proofness and Efficiency for Non-quasi-linear Common-Tiered-Object Preferences: Characterization of Minimum Price Rule," ISER Discussion Paper 0971, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.

Articles

  1. Zhou, Yu & Serizawa, Shigehiro, 2018. "Strategy-proofness and efficiency for non-quasi-linear and common-tiered-object preferences: Characterization of minimum price rule," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 327-363.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. William PHAN & Ryan TIERNEY & Yu ZHOU, 2021. "Crowding in School Choice," Discussion papers e-21-006, Graduate School of Economics , Kyoto University.

    Cited by:

    1. Tomoya KAZUMURA, 2020. "When can we design efficient and strategy-proof rules in package assignment problems?," Discussion papers e-21-008, Graduate School of Economics , Kyoto University.

  2. Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Zhou, Yu, 2019. "Competitive Equilibria in Matching Models with Financial Constraints," Research Memorandum 007, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).

    Cited by:

    1. Elizabeth Baldwin & Omer Edhan & Ravi Jagadeesan & Paul Klemperer & Alexander Teytelboym, 2020. "The Equilibrium Existence Duality: Equilibrium with Indivisibilities & Income Effects," Papers 2006.16939, arXiv.org.
    2. Herings, P. Jean-Jacques, 2020. "Expectational Equilibria in Many-to-one Matching Models with Contracts - A Reformulation of Competitive Equilibrium," Research Memorandum 018, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
    3. Hevér, Judit, 2020. "A piaci likviditás és a szabályozás kapcsolatának vizsgálata általános egyensúlyelméleti modellkeretben [The effect of regulation on market liquidity: a general equilibrium approach]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(7), pages 708-733.
    4. Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Zhou, Yu, 2021. "Equilibria in Matching Markets with Soft and Hard Liquidity Constraints," Research Memorandum 013, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).

  3. Yu Zhou & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2019. "Minimum price equilibrium in the assignment market," ISER Discussion Paper 1047, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.

    Cited by:

    1. Caplin, Andrew & Leahy, John, 2020. "Comparative statics in markets for indivisible goods," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 80-94.
    2. Kazumura, Tomoya & Mishra, Debasis & Serizawa, Shigehiro, 2020. "Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: Ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).

  4. Yu Zhou & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2016. "Strategy-Proofness and Efficiency for Non-quasi-linear Common-Tiered-Object Preferences: Characterization of Minimum Price Rule," ISER Discussion Paper 0971, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.

    Cited by:

    1. Yu Zhou & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2020. "Serial Vickrey Mechanism," ISER Discussion Paper 1095, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    2. Kazumura, Tomoya & Mishra, Debasis & Serizawa, Shigehiro, 2020. "Mechanism design without quasilinearity," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(2), May.
    3. Tomoya Kazumura & Debasis Mishra & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2017. "Strategy-proof multi-object auction design: Ex-post revenue maximization with no wastage," Discussion Papers 17-03, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi.
    4. Tomoya Kazumura & Debasis Mishra & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2017. "Strategy-proof multi-object allocation: Ex-post revenue maximization with no wastage," Working Papers e116, Tokyo Center for Economic Research.
    5. Andersson, Tommy & Svensson, Lars-Gunnar, 2015. "Sequential Rules for House Allocation with Price Restrictions," Working Papers 2015:18, Lund University, Department of Economics, revised 11 Oct 2017.
    6. Yu Zhou & Youngsub Chun & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2022. "A characterization of the Vickrey rule in slot allocation problems," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 18(1), pages 38-49, March.

Articles

  1. Zhou, Yu & Serizawa, Shigehiro, 2018. "Strategy-proofness and efficiency for non-quasi-linear and common-tiered-object preferences: Characterization of minimum price rule," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 327-363.

    Cited by:

    1. Ryosuke Sakai & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2023. "Strategy-proof mechanism design with non-quasi-linear preferences: ex-post revenue maximization for an arbitrary number of objects," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 60(1), pages 103-120, January.
    2. Liu, Peng & Zeng, Huaxia, 2019. "Random assignments on preference domains with a tier structure," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 176-194.
    3. Zhang, Jun, 2020. "When are efficient and fair assignment mechanisms group strategy-proof?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 251-266.
    4. Yu Zhou & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2019. "Minimum price equilibrium in the assignment market," ISER Discussion Paper 1047, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    5. Tomoya KAZUMURA, 2020. "When can we design efficient and strategy-proof rules in package assignment problems?," Discussion papers e-21-008, Graduate School of Economics , Kyoto University.
    6. Komal Malik & Debasis Mishra, 2020. "Pareto efficient combinatorial auctions: dichotomous preferences without quasilinearity," Papers 2009.12114, arXiv.org.
    7. Kazumura, Tomoya & Mishra, Debasis & Serizawa, Shigehiro, 2020. "Mechanism design without quasilinearity," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(2), May.
    8. Malik, Komal & Mishra, Debasis, 2021. "Pareto efficient combinatorial auctions: Dichotomous preferences without quasilinearity," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
    9. Kazumura, Tomoya & Mishra, Debasis & Serizawa, Shigehiro, 2020. "Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: Ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
    10. Ryosuke Sakai & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2020. "Strategy-proof mechanism design with non-quasilinear preferences: Ex-post revenue maximization for an arbitrary number of objects," ISER Discussion Paper 1107, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.

More information

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Statistics

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NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 4 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-DES: Economic Design (3) 2019-01-28 2019-04-08 2021-11-08. Author is listed
  2. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (3) 2016-06-25 2019-04-08 2021-11-08. Author is listed
  3. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (2) 2016-06-25 2019-01-28. Author is listed
  4. NEP-UPT: Utility Models and Prospect Theory (2) 2016-06-25 2019-01-28. Author is listed
  5. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (1) 2019-04-08. Author is listed
  6. NEP-NET: Network Economics (1) 2016-06-25. Author is listed
  7. NEP-URE: Urban and Real Estate Economics (1) 2021-11-08. Author is listed

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