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Yunmi Kong

Personal Details

First Name:Yunmi
Middle Name:
Last Name:Kong
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pko1049
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
Terminal Degree:2016 Department of Economics; New York University (NYU) (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

Department of Economics
Rice University

Houston, Texas (United States)
http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~econ/
RePEc:edi:dericus (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Articles

Articles

  1. Yunmi Kong & Isabelle Perrigne & Quang Vuong, 2022. "Multidimensional Auctions of Contracts: An Empirical Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 112(5), pages 1703-1736, May.
  2. Kong, Yunmi, 2022. "Identification of English auctions when losing entrants are not observed," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 85(C).
  3. Yunmi Kong, 2021. "Sequential Auctions with Synergy and Affiliation across Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 129(1), pages 148-181.
  4. Yunmi Kong, 2020. "Not knowing the competition: evidence and implications for auction design," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(3), pages 840-867, September.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Articles

  1. Yunmi Kong & Isabelle Perrigne & Quang Vuong, 2022. "Multidimensional Auctions of Contracts: An Empirical Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 112(5), pages 1703-1736, May.

    Cited by:

    1. Lamy, Laurent & Patnam, Manasa & Visser, Michael, 2023. "Distinguishing incentive from selection effects in auction-determined contracts," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 235(2), pages 1172-1202.
    2. Janssen, Aljoscha, 2022. "Innovation Begets Innovation and Concentration: The Case of Upstream Oil & Gas in the North Sea," Working Paper Series 1431, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    3. Michele Fioretti & Alessandro Iaria & Aljoscha Janssen & Cl'ement Mazet-Sonilhac & Robert K. Perrons, 2022. "Innovation Begets Innovation and Concentration: The Case of Upstream Oil & Gas in the North Sea," Papers 2205.13186, arXiv.org, revised May 2022.

  2. Yunmi Kong, 2021. "Sequential Auctions with Synergy and Affiliation across Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 129(1), pages 148-181.

    Cited by:

    1. Philip A. Haile & Yuichi Kitamura, 2018. "Unobserved Heterogeneity in Auctions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2141, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    2. Yunmi Kong, 2020. "Not knowing the competition: evidence and implications for auction design," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(3), pages 840-867, September.
    3. Pietro Bonaldi & Mauricio Villamizar-Villegas, 2018. "An Auction-Based Test of Private Information in an Interdealer FX Market," Working papers 1, Red Investigadores de Economía.
    4. Zachary Breig & Allan Hernández-Chanto & Declan Hunt, 2022. "Experimental Auctions with Securities," Discussion Papers Series 657, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
    5. Lamy, Laurent & Patnam, Manasa & Visser, Michael, 2023. "Distinguishing incentive from selection effects in auction-determined contracts," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 235(2), pages 1172-1202.
    6. Janssen, Aljoscha, 2022. "Innovation Begets Innovation and Concentration: The Case of Upstream Oil & Gas in the North Sea," Working Paper Series 1431, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    7. Matilde Cappelletti & Leonardo M. Giuffrida & Gabriele Rovigatti & Leonardo Maria Giuffrida, 2022. "Procuring Survival," CESifo Working Paper Series 10124, CESifo.
    8. Michele Fioretti & Alessandro Iaria & Aljoscha Janssen & Cl'ement Mazet-Sonilhac & Robert K. Perrons, 2022. "Innovation Begets Innovation and Concentration: The Case of Upstream Oil & Gas in the North Sea," Papers 2205.13186, arXiv.org, revised May 2022.
    9. Mauricio Villamizar-Villegas & Freddy A. Pinzón-Puerto & María Alejandra Ruiz-Sánchez, 2020. "A Comprehensive History of Regression Discontinuity Designs: An Empirical Survey of the last 60 Years," Borradores de Economia 1112, Banco de la Republica de Colombia.
    10. Fanqi Shi & Yiqing Xing, 2022. "Implementing optimal outcomes through sequential auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 53(4), pages 703-732, December.
    11. Kim, Dong-Hyuk & Ratan, Anmol, 2022. "Disentangling risk aversion and loss aversion in first-price auctions: An empirical approach," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 150(C).
    12. Laurent Lamy & Manasa Patnam & Michael Visser, 2023. "Distinguishing incentive from selection effects in auction-determined contracts," Post-Print hal-04382099, HAL.
    13. Yunmi Kong & Isabelle Perrigne & Quang Vuong, 2022. "Multidimensional Auctions of Contracts: An Empirical Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 112(5), pages 1703-1736, May.
    14. Lu, Jiaxuan, 2023. "The economics of China’s between-city height competition: A regression discontinuity approach," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(C).
    15. Gentry, Matthew & Komarova, Tatiana & Schiraldi, Pasquale, 2023. "Preferences and performance in simultaneous first-price auctions: a structural analysis," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 115627, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.

  3. Yunmi Kong, 2020. "Not knowing the competition: evidence and implications for auction design," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(3), pages 840-867, September.

    Cited by:

    1. Bolotnyy, Valentin & Vasserman, Shoshana, 2023. "Scaling Auctions as Insurance: A Case Study in Infrastructure Procurement," Research Papers 3887, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    2. Thomas R. Covert & Richard L. Sweeney, 2023. "Relinquishing Riches: Auctions versus Informal Negotiations in Texas Oil and Gas Leasing," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 113(3), pages 628-663, March.
    3. Kong, Yunmi, 2022. "Identification of English auctions when losing entrants are not observed," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 85(C).
    4. Yao Luo & Peijun Sang & Ruli Xiao, 2022. "Order Statistics Approaches to Unobserved Heterogeneity in Auctions," Papers 2210.03547, arXiv.org.
    5. Samuel Häfner, 2023. "Risk aversion in share auctions: Estimating import rents from TRQs in Switzerland," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(2), pages 419-470, May.
    6. Vasserman, Shoshana & Watt, Mitchell, 2021. "Risk aversion and auction design: Theoretical and empirical evidence," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    7. Yunmi Kong & Isabelle Perrigne & Quang Vuong, 2022. "Multidimensional Auctions of Contracts: An Empirical Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 112(5), pages 1703-1736, May.

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