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Interoperabilitätsvorschriften für digitale Dienste: Bedeutung für Wettbewerb, Innovation und digitale Souveränität insbesondere für Plattform- und Kommunikationsdienste

Author

Listed:
  • Wiewiorra, Lukas
  • Steffen, Nico
  • Thoste, Philipp
  • Fourberg, Niklas
  • Taş, Serpil
  • Kroon, Peter
  • Busch, Christoph
  • Krämer, Jan

Abstract

Digitale Märkte weisen starke Konzentrationstendenzen und eine Entwicklung zu immer stärker verzahnten, sich verschließenden Ökosystemen auf. In dieser Studie wird (ein Mangel an) Interoperabilität (IOP) als mögliche Ursache oder Treiber solcher Konzentrationstendenzen beleuchtet und der Bedarf für entsprechende IOP-Verpflichtungen analysiert. Dabei werden neben den Zielen und möglichen positiven Auswirkungen solcher Vorschriften auch eine Reihe von Risiken herausgearbeitet. IOP kann einerseits das Nutzen von zuvor firmenspezifischen Netzwerkeffekten für mehr Marktteilnehmer auf horizontaler und vertikaler Ebene ermöglichen und somit Lock-In-Effekte reduzieren. Auf vertikaler Ebene können so häufig Innovationsanreize und modulare Kombinationsmöglichkeiten über vor- und nachgelagerte Wertschöpfungsstufen hinweg geschaffen werden. Insbesondere auf horizontaler Ebene kann es aber auch zu einer Einschränkung von Differenzierungs- und Innovationsmöglichkeiten kommen, da IOP ein gewisses Maß an Homogenisierung bedingt, gerade wenn aus technischer Sicht eine starke Standardisierung erforderlich ist, um eine effektive IOP zu erreichen. Neben technischen, ökonomischen und juristischen Grundlagen von IOP und deren Auswirkungen auf Dienste der Plattformökonomie liegt der Fokus der Studie insbesondere auf Online-Kommunikationsdiensten und nummernunabhängigen interpersonellen Telekommunikationsdiensten (NI-ICS), für die zuletzt im Digital Markets Act (DMA) eine IOP-Verpflichtung vorgesehen wurde. Zwar ist der Markt der Online-Kommunikationsdienste stark durch Dienste des Meta-Konzerns geprägt, dennoch ist Multi-Homing (das parallele Nutzen unterschiedlicher Dienste) als Alternative zu IOP hier günstig möglich und entsprechend stark verbreitet. Demgegenüber stehen gerade durch die hohe technische Komplexität solcher Dienste eine Reihe von Kosten und Risiken von IOP-Verpflichtungen, die mögliche Abstriche u. a. des Sicherheitsniveaus, der Nutzbarkeit und der Marktakzeptanz befürchten lassen. Vor diesem Hintergrund sollte die anstehende praktische Implementierung regulatorisch eng begleitet werden, um die identifizierten Risiken bestmöglich zu minimieren.

Suggested Citation

  • Wiewiorra, Lukas & Steffen, Nico & Thoste, Philipp & Fourberg, Niklas & Taş, Serpil & Kroon, Peter & Busch, Christoph & Krämer, Jan, 2022. "Interoperabilitätsvorschriften für digitale Dienste: Bedeutung für Wettbewerb, Innovation und digitale Souveränität insbesondere für Plattform- und Kommunikationsdienste," Study Series, WIK Wissenschaftliches Institut für Infrastruktur und Kommunikationsdienste GmbH, number 265393.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:wikstu:265393
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    References listed on IDEAS

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