Competition Policy and Price Fixing
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- Harrington, Joseph E. & Hernan Gonzalez, Roberto & Kujal, Praveen, 2016.
"The relative efficacy of price announcements and express communication for collusion: Experimental findings,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 251-264.
- Joseph E. Harrington, Jr & Roberto Hernan-Gonzalez & Praveen Kujal, 2013. "The Relative Efficacy of Price Announcements and Express Communication for Collusion: Experimental Findings," Working Papers 13-30, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
- Luis Cabral, 2014.
"We're Number 1: Price Wars for Market Share Leadership,"
14-01, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Cabral, Luís M B, 2014. "We're Number 1: Price Wars for Market Share Leadership," CEPR Discussion Papers 9818, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Harrington, Joseph E., 2017. "A theory of collusion with partial mutual understanding," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 140-158.
- Kaplow, Louis, 2015. "Market definition, market power," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 148-161.
- Joseph Farrell, 2015. "The U.S. Federal Trade Commission at 100: A Symposium on FTC Economics," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 46(1), pages 1-3, February.
- Louis Kaplow, 2015. "Market Definition, Market Power," NBER Working Papers 21167, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
More about this item
Keywordscompetition; price fixing; oligopoly; modern competition; competition law; horizontal agreement; price elevation; coordinated price elevation;
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