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The Failure of Judges and the Rise of Regulators

Author

Listed:
  • Shleifer, Andrei

    () (Harvard University)

Abstract

Government regulation is ubiquitous today in rich and middle-income countries--present in areas that range from workplace conditions to food processing to school curricula--although standard economic theories predict that it should be rather uncommon. In this book, Andrei Shleifer argues that the ubiquity of regulation can be explained not so much by the failure of markets as by the failure of courts to solve contract and tort disputes cheaply, predictably, and impartially. When courts are expensive, unpredictable, and biased, the public will seek alternatives to dispute resolution. The form this alternative has taken throughout the world is regulation. The Failure of Judges and the Rise of Regulators gathers Shleifer’s influential writings on regulation and adds to them a substantial introductory essay in which Shleifer critiques the standard theories of economic regulation and proposes “the Enforcement Theory of Regulation,” which sees regulation as the more efficient strategy for social control of business. Subsequent chapters present the theoretical and empirical case against the efficiency of courts, make the historical and theoretical case for the comparative efficiency of regulation, and offer two empirical studies suggesting circumstances in which regulation might emerge as an efficient solution to social problems. Shleifer does not offer an unconditional endorsement of regulation and its expansion but rather argues that it is better than its alternatives, particularly litigation.

Suggested Citation

  • Shleifer, Andrei, 2012. "The Failure of Judges and the Rise of Regulators," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262016958, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:mtp:titles:0262016958
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Flavio Menezes & Magnus Söderberg & Miguel Santolino, 2012. "Regulatory behaviour under threat of court reversal," Discussion Papers Series 472, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
    2. TAKEDA Yosuke & UCHIDA Ichihiro, 2015. "Innovation and Legal Enforcement for Competition Policy: Theory and international evidence from overseas subsidiaries of the Japanese auto-parts suppliers," Discussion papers 15046, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
    3. repec:ces:ifodic:v:12:y:2014:i:3:p:19131886 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Louis Kaplow, 2017. "Optimal Regulation with Exemptions," NBER Working Papers 23887, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Hyytinen, Ari & Steen, Frode & Toivanen, Otto, 2012. "Anatomy of Cartel Contracts," Discussion Paper Series in Economics 25/2012, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Economics.
    6. Julien Daubanes & Jean-Charles Rochet, 2013. "Activists versus Captured Regulators," CESifo Working Paper Series 4444, CESifo Group Munich.
    7. Peter Grajzl, 2014. "Behind the Courts’ Walls: Empirical Insights from Slovenia," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 12(3), pages 39-44, October.
    8. Bretschger, Lucas, 2015. "Greening Economy, Graying Society," MPRA Paper 66218, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Julien Daubanes & Jean-Charles Rochet, 2016. "The Rise of NGO Activism," CESifo Working Paper Series 5891, CESifo Group Munich.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    finance; regulation; economic theory;

    JEL classification:

    • K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law
    • G1 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets

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