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Differential Games in Industrial Economics

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  • Lambertini,Luca

Abstract

Game theory has revolutionised our understanding of industrial organisation and the traditional theory of the firm. Despite these advances, industrial economists have tended to rely on a restricted set of tools from game theory, focusing on static and repeated games to analyse firm structure and behaviour. Luca Lambertini, a leading expert on the application of differential game theory to economics, argues that many dynamic phenomena in industrial organisation (such as monopoly, oligopoly, advertising, R&D races) can be better understood and analysed through the use of differential games. After illustrating the basic elements of the theory, Lambertini guides the reader through the main models, spanning from optimal control problems describing the behaviour of a monopolist through to oligopoly games in which firms' strategies include prices, quantities and investments. This approach will be of great value to students and researchers in economics and those interested in advanced applications of game theory.

Suggested Citation

  • Lambertini,Luca, 2018. "Differential Games in Industrial Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107164680.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:cbooks:9781107164680
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    Cited by:

    1. Masahiko Hattori & Yasuhito Tanaka, 2019. "General analysis of dynamic oligopoly with sticky price," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 39(4), pages 2990-2998.
    2. Bisceglia, Michele & Cellini, Roberto & Siciliani, Luigi & Straume, Odd Rune, 2020. "Optimal dynamic volume-based price regulation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    3. Lambertini, Luca, 2021. "Regulating the tragedy of commons: Nonlinear feedback solutions of a differential game with a dual interpretation," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(C).
    4. Andrea Caravaggio & Luigi De Cesare & Andrea Di Liddo, 2023. "A Differential Game for Optimal Water Price Management," Games, MDPI, vol. 14(2), pages 1-15, April.
    5. Bertrand Crettez & Naila Hayek & Peter M. Kort, 2021. "A Dynamic Multi-Objective Duopoly Game with Capital Accumulation and Pollution," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 9(16), pages 1-34, August.
    6. Masahiko Hattori & Yasuhito Tanaka, 2022. "Dynamic analysis of R&D in an oligopoly under general demand and cost functions," OPSEARCH, Springer;Operational Research Society of India, vol. 59(2), pages 694-710, June.
    7. Feichtinger, Gustav & Lambertini, Luca & Leitmann, George & Wrzaczek, Stefan, 2022. "Managing the tragedy of commons and polluting emissions: A unified view," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 303(1), pages 487-499.
    8. Gustav Feichtinger & Richard F. Hartl & Peter M. Kort & Andrea Seidl & Stefan Wrzaczek, 2022. "Asymmetric Information in a Capital Accumulation Differential Game with Spillover and Learning Effects," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 194(3), pages 878-895, September.
    9. Masahiko Hattori & Yasuhito Tanaka, 2021. "Advertising in an oligopoly with differentiated goods under general demand and cost functions: A differential game approach," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 89(6), pages 619-639, December.
    10. Guerrazzi, Marco & Candido, Giuseppe, 2023. "The determination of the price of capital goods: A differential game approach," MPRA Paper 119118, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Konrad, Kai A. & Thum, Marcel, 2023. "Elusive effects of export embargoes for fossil energy resources," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 117(C).
    12. Dragone, Davide & Lambertini, Luca & Palestini, Arsen, 2022. "Emission taxation, green innovations and inverted-U aggregate R&D efforts in a linear state differential game," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 62-68.
    13. Akihiko Yanase & Keita Kamei, 2022. "Dynamic Game of International Pollution Control with General Oligopolistic Equilibrium: Neary Meets Dockner and Long," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 751-783, September.

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