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Bargaining Over Losses

Author

Listed:
  • JAYSON L. LUSK

    (Department of Agricultural Economics, Oklahoma State University, 411 Ag Hall Stillwater, OK 74078, USA)

  • M. DARREN HUDSON

    (Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics, Texas Tech University, MS 42132 Lubbock, TX 79409-2132, USA)

Abstract

We introduce a modified version of the Ultimatum game where people bargain over losses instead of gains. Results show that when people bargain over losses, they make more aggressive offers, in terms of their own monetary well-being, as compared to when they bargained over gains.

Suggested Citation

  • Jayson L. Lusk & M. Darren Hudson, 2010. "Bargaining Over Losses," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 12(01), pages 83-91.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:12:y:2010:i:01:n:s0219198910002532
    DOI: 10.1142/S0219198910002532
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Ravetti, Chiara & Sarr, Mare & Munene, Daniel & Swanson, Tim, 2019. "Discrimination and favouritism among South African workers: Ethnic identity and union membership," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 1-1.
    2. Guillermo Baquero & Willem Smit & Luc Wathieu, 2013. "The generosity effect: Fairness in sharing gains and losses," ESMT Research Working Papers ESMT-13-08, ESMT European School of Management and Technology.
    3. François Cochard & Alexandre Flage & Gilles Grolleau & Angela Sutan, 2020. "Are individuals more generous in loss contexts?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 55(4), pages 845-866, December.
    4. Li, Shuwen & Houser, Daniel, 2022. "Stochastic bargaining in the lab," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 200(C), pages 687-715.
    5. Thomas Neumann & Sabrina Kierspel & Ivo Windrich & Roger Berger & Bodo Vogt, 2018. "How to Split Gains and Losses? Experimental Evidence of Dictator and Ultimatum Games," Games, MDPI, vol. 9(4), pages 1-19, October.
    6. Doll, Monika & Seebauer, Michael & Tonn, Maren, 2017. "Bargaining over waiting time in gain and loss framed ultimatum games," FAU Discussion Papers in Economics 15/2017, Friedrich-Alexander University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Institute for Economics.
    7. Benistant, Julien & Suchon, Rémi, 2021. "It does (not) get better: Reference income violation and altruism," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 85(C).
    8. François Cochard & Alexandre Flage, 2023. "Sharing Losses in Dictator and Ultimatum Games: A Meta-Analysis," Working Papers 2023-09, CRESE.
    9. Kroll, Eike B. & Morgenstern, Ralf & Neumann, Thomas & Schosser, Stephan & Vogt, Bodo, 2014. "Bargaining power does not matter when sharing losses – Experimental evidence of equal split in the Nash bargaining game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 261-272.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bargaining; loss aversion; negative ultimatum bargaining game; Subject Classification: 91A90; Subject Classification: 91B99; Subject Classification: 91C99; Subject Classification: 91A05; Subject Classification: 91A10;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B4 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology
    • C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General
    • C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • M2 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics

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