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Beyond Conventional Boundaries

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  • Alexander Kupatadze

Abstract

According to conventional wisdom, organized criminal activity is perpetrated primarily by non‐state, private actors who are occasionally [or not] protected by corrupt government officials. From this perspective, a hard distinction is made between those who provide protection to criminals (e.g., politicians or law enforcement officials) and the criminals themselves (e.g., smugglers or producers of counterfeit goods). It further treats the involvement of state‐affiliated actors as a by‐product of corruption in public office, rather than, in some places, a feature of it. This article builds on emerging evidence that state representatives play a far more direct role in supervising, organizing and sometimes managing crime than assumed in the majority of the literature. It shows that there are inherent theoretical, policy‐level biases that misguide the analytical thinking about organized crime in the Global South, and argues that there is a need to reconsider existing approaches to develop more accommodative definitions of organized crime. De acuerdo con la sabiduría convencional, la actividad delictiva organizada es perpetrada principalmente por actores privados no estatales que ocasionalmente están [o no] protegidos por funcionarios gubernamentales corruptos. Desde esta perspectiva, se hace una distinción estricta entre quienes brindan protección a los delincuentes (p. ej., políticos o funcionarios encargados de hacer cumplir la ley) y los propios delincuentes (p. ej., contrabandistas o productores de productos falsificados). Además, trata la participación de actores afiliados al estado como un subproducto de la corrupción en los cargos públicos, en lugar de, en algunos lugares, como una característica de la misma. Este artículo se basa en la evidencia emergente de que los representantes estatales juegan un papel mucho más directo en la supervisión, organización y, a veces, gestión del crimen de lo que se supone en la mayoría de la literatura. Muestra que existen sesgos teóricos inherentes a nivel de políticas que desvían el pensamiento analítico sobre el crimen organizado en el Sur Global y argumenta que es necesario reconsiderar los enfoques existentes para desarrollar definiciones más acomodaticias del crimen organizado. 传统观点认为,有组织犯罪活动主要由非国家的私人行动者实施,这些行动者偶尔受到腐败政府官员的保护。从这个角度来看,为罪犯提供保护的人(例如政客或执法人员)和罪犯本身(例如走私者或假冒商品生产者)之间存在明显区别。本文进一步将隶属于国家的行动者的参与视为公职腐败的副产品,而不是某些地方的特征。本文基于一项新兴证据,即国家代表在监督、组织和管理犯罪方面发挥的作用比大多数文献所假设的作用要直接得多。本文表明,固有的理论偏见和政策偏见误导了对全球南方有组织犯罪的分析思考,并论证认为,有必要重新考量现有的方法,以制定更符合有组织犯罪的定义。

Suggested Citation

  • Alexander Kupatadze, 2023. "Beyond Conventional Boundaries," World Affairs, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 186(3), pages 747-775, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:woraff:v:186:y:2023:i:3:p:747-775
    DOI: 10.1177/00438200231178852
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic & Denisa Kostovicova & Mariana Escobar & Jelena Bjelica, 2015. "Organised crime and international aid subversion: evidence from Colombia and Afghanistan," Third World Quarterly, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 36(10), pages 1887-1905, October.
    2. Bojicic-Dzelilovic, Vesna & Kostovicova, Denisa & Escobar, Mariana & Bjelica, Jelena, 2015. "Organised crime and international aid subversion: evidence from Colombia and Afghanistan," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 62748, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
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    4. Varese, Federico, 2001. "The Russian Mafia: Private Protection in a New Market Economy," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198297369.
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