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Trump, Bolsonaro, And The Framing Of The Covid‐19 Crisis

Author

Listed:
  • Daniel Béland
  • Philip Rocco
  • Catarina Ianni Segatto
  • Alex Waddan

Abstract

In the aftermath of the global COVID‐19 crisis, whereas many world leaders enacted swift lockdown orders and robust testing regimes to preserve public health and to speed up economic recovery, Donald Trump in the United States and Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil responded to outbreaks by publicly downplaying the significance of the crisis and argued that overly restrictive health measures would create too sizable an economic risk. These two presidents have done much to weaken democracy and trust in government. In this article, we examine the extent to which two institutions in each country––federalism and the party system––impacted the ways in which they framed the COVID‐19 crisis and policy responses to it in 2020, especially during the first months of the pandemic. Our evidence suggests that each of these institutions provided opportunities for both leaders to reconstruct public understandings of the crisis while deflecting blame for negative public‐health outcomes. A raíz de la crisis mundial de COVID‐19, mientras que muchos líderes mundiales promulgaron órdenes de bloqueo rápidas y regímenes de prueba sólidos para preservar la salud pública y acelerar la recuperación económica, Donald Trump en los Estados Unidos y Jair Bolsonaro en Brasil respondieron a los brotes públicamente minimizando la importancia de la crisis y argumentó que las medidas sanitarias excesivamente restrictivas crearían un riesgo económico demasiado grande. Estos dos presidentes han hecho mucho para debilitar la democracia y la confianza en el gobierno. En este artículo, examinamos hasta qué punto dos instituciones en cada país –– el federalismo y el sistema de partidos– impactaron la forma en que enmarcaron la crisis del COVID‐19 y las respuestas políticas a la misma en 2020, especialmente durante los primeros meses de la pandemia. Nuestra evidencia sugiere que cada una de estas instituciones brindó oportunidades para que ambos líderes reconstruyeran la comprensión pública de la crisis mientras desviaban la culpa por los resultados negativos de salud pública. 在全球新冠肺炎(COVID19)危机造成的严重影响下,许多国家领导者颁布了迅速的封城令和稳健的检测制度,以期保护公共卫生并加速经济恢复,然而美国总统唐纳德·特朗普和巴西总统雅伊尔·博索纳罗对疫情爆发所采取的响应却是公开轻视其严重性,并认为过多的限制性卫生措施将造成严重经济危机。这两位总统的诸多行为都削弱了民主和政府信任。本文中,我们分析了联邦制和党派系统分别以多大程度影响了两国在2020年对新冠肺炎危机的建构以及政策响应,尤其是在大流行最初几个月里。我们的研究结果暗示,两种制度都为这两位总统提供机会重新建构关于危机的公共理解,同时为负面公共卫生结果规避责任。

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel Béland & Philip Rocco & Catarina Ianni Segatto & Alex Waddan, 2021. "Trump, Bolsonaro, And The Framing Of The Covid‐19 Crisis," World Affairs, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 184(4), pages 413-440, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:woraff:v:184:y:2021:i:4:p:413-440
    DOI: 10.1177/00438200211053314
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    References listed on IDEAS

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