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Global Governance, Tax Treaties, and Credible Commitments

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  • Austin P. Johnson

Abstract

The international tax regime appears to be a weak system of global governance on the surface; however, I find that this system remains effective. This governance structure is built upon the thousands of tax treaties that function as policy instruments for advancing the implementation of global tax policy. Yet there is conflicting evidence in relation to the efficacy of these treaties, necessitating further exploration. In this article, I offer an accessible introduction to some of the key dynamics of the international tax regime and, in doing so, systematically address whether tax treaties may have the capacity to spur cross‐border investment in securities. Using augmented gravity models, I find strong empirical evidence in favor of my theory that tax treaties function as credible commitments to international tax norms, potentially increasing portfolio holdings of some foreign securities. My findings should be of significant importance to scholars of international organizations, global governance, and international tax policy. Eran antes una provincia solo para los hombres, pero ahora los gabinetes en las democracias han tenido una mucho mayor diversidad de género que en años recientes, ya que muchos gobiernos tienen mujeres en los puestos más influyentes. Este análisis examina el efecto de la diversidad de género en un aspecto del desempeño gubernamental: la duración de los gobiernos en sistemas parlamentarios. Evalúo el argumento que las mujeres que fungen en grupos orientados hacia las tareas complejas (en este caso los gabinetes de gobierno), particularmente cuando están en puestos influyentes, crean el potencial para gobiernos parlamentarios que tienden a durar más que otros gobiernos. Utilizando datos extraídos de 125 gabinetes europeos en 13 países, evalúo este argumento y una serie de controles al usar varios modelos de riesgo y los suplemento con simulaciones de varios escenarios empíricos interesantes. Encuentro un apoyo matizado para este argumento—sí importa que haya un mayor número de mujeres, pero solo cuando las mujeres fungen en puestos influyentes de la oficina del primer ministro o primera ministra. 摘要:从表面上看,国际税收体制似乎是一个薄弱的全球治理体系; 但是,笔者发现,它仍然是一个非常高效的体系。 它的治理结构建立在成千上万的税收协定基础之上,后者是推动实现全球税收政策的政策工具。然而,由于存在与税收协定有效性相冲突的证据,因此还需对其进行深入探索。在这篇文章中,笔者系统地论述了税收协定能否在证券领域内推动跨境投资。通过使用扩展引力模型(augmented gravity models),笔者发现了能有力支持其理论的实证证据,该理论即:对国际税收规范而言,税收协定是一种可信的承诺,它会潜在增加一些外国证券的投资组合。对研究国际组织、全球治理和国际税收政策的学者而言,笔者的这一发现应该具有重要意义。

Suggested Citation

  • Austin P. Johnson, 2018. "Global Governance, Tax Treaties, and Credible Commitments," World Affairs, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 181(1), pages 69-98, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:woraff:v:181:y:2018:i:1:p:69-98
    DOI: 10.1177/0043820018776410
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hartmut Lenz, 2018. "Achieving Effective International Cooperation: How Institutional Formalization Shapes Intergovernmental Negotiations," World Affairs, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 181(2), pages 161-180, June.

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