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Continuity, change, and priorities: The quality and use of regulatory analysis across US administrations

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  • Jerry Ellig
  • Patrick A. McLaughlin
  • John F. Morrall III

Abstract

This paper compares the quality and use of regulatory analysis accompanying economically significant regulations proposed by US executive branch agencies in 2008, 2009, and 2010. We find that the quality of regulatory analysis is generally low, but varies widely. Budget regulations, which define how the federal government will spend money or collect revenues, have much lower‐quality analysis than other regulations. The Bush administration's “midnight” regulations finalized between Election Day and Inauguration Day, along with other regulations left for the Obama administration to finalize, tended to have lower‐quality analysis. Most differences between the Bush and Obama administrations depend on agencies' policy preferences. More conservative agencies tended to produce better analysis in the Obama administration, and more liberal agencies tended to do so in the Bush administration. This suggests that agencies more central to an administration's policy priorities do not have to produce as good an analysis to get their regulations promulgated.

Suggested Citation

  • Jerry Ellig & Patrick A. McLaughlin & John F. Morrall III, 2013. "Continuity, change, and priorities: The quality and use of regulatory analysis across US administrations," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 7(2), pages 153-173, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:reggov:v:7:y:2013:i:2:p:153-173
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1748-5991.2012.01149.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Winston Harrington & Richard D. Morgenstern & Peter Nelson, 2000. "On the accuracy of regulatory cost estimates," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 19(2), pages 297-322.
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    3. Patrick McLaughlin, 2011. "The consequences of midnight regulations and other surges in regulatory activity," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 147(3), pages 395-412, June.
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    7. Jerry Ellig & Patrick A. McLaughlin, 2012. "The Quality and Use of Regulatory Analysis in 2008," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 32(5), pages 855-880, May.
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    9. repec:reg:rpubli:299 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Art Fraas & Randall Lutter, 2011. "The Challenges of Improving the Economic Analysis of Pending Regulations: The Experience of OMB Circular A-4," Annual Review of Resource Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 3(1), pages 71-85, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ellig, Jerry, 2016. "Evaluating the Quality and Use of Regulatory Impact Analysis: The Mercatus Center’s Regulatory Report Card, 2008–2013," Working Papers 06878, George Mason University, Mercatus Center.
    2. Branden B. Johnson & Adam M. Finkel, 2023. "Sensitivity to scope in estimating the social benefits of prolonging lives for regulatory decisions using national stated preference tradeoffs," Environment Systems and Decisions, Springer, vol. 43(3), pages 509-528, September.
    3. McLaughlin, Patrick & Stanley, Laura, 2016. "Regulation and Income Inequality: The Regressive Effects of Entry Regulations," Working Papers 05145, George Mason University, Mercatus Center.
    4. Ellig, Jerry & Horney, Michael, 2016. "Preventing a Regulatory Train Wreck: Mandated Regulation and the Cautionary Tale of Positive Train Control," Working Papers 06865, George Mason University, Mercatus Center.
    5. Ellig, Jerry, 2016. "Improvements in SEC Economic Analysis since Business Roundtable: A Structured Assessment," Working Papers 07002, George Mason University, Mercatus Center.

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