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Leadership and information in a single‐shot collective action game: An experimental study

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  • Mana Komai
  • Philip J. Grossman
  • Travis Deters

Abstract

We consider a leader–follower mechanism in a collective action game, which exhibits both free riding and coordination problems. Leaders can persuade group cooperation by making a costly commitment to a project. Followers can choose to follow their leaders. The project's return can be transparent to all or only to the leaders. We show experimentally that when free riding is the dominant strategy of an informed subject, concentrating information in the hands of the leaders improves cooperation more effectively than a regime of information dispersal. The coordination problem, however, may be reduced more effectively in a regime of information dispersal. Copyright (C) 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Suggested Citation

  • Mana Komai & Philip J. Grossman & Travis Deters, 2011. "Leadership and information in a single‐shot collective action game: An experimental study," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 32(2), pages 119-134, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:32:y:2011:i:2:p:119-134
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1522
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Doruk İriş & Jungmin Lee & Alessandro Tavoni, 2015. "Delegation and public pressure in a threshold public goods game: theory and experimental evidence," GRI Working Papers 186, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment.
    2. Gürerk, Özgür & Lauer, Thomas & Scheuermann, Martin, 2018. "Leadership with individual rewards and punishments," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 57-69.
    3. Doruk İriş & Jungmin Lee & Alessandro Tavoni, 2015. "Delegation and public pressure in a threshold public goods game: theory and experimental evidence," GRI Working Papers 186, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment.
    4. Molle, Mana Komai & Grossman, Philip J. & Kulas, John T. & Lo, Siu Pong, 2023. "Does a leader's self-assessed integrity matter?," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 104(C).
    5. Philip J. Grossman & Mana Komai & Evelyne Benie, 2011. "Are Claims Of Transparency All They Are Cracked Up To Be?," Monash Economics Working Papers 27-11, Monash University, Department of Economics.
    6. Bryan C. McCannon, 2018. "Leadership and motivation for public goods contributions," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 65(1), pages 68-96, February.
    7. Selhan Garip Sahin & Catherine Eckel & Mana Komai, 2015. "An experimental study of leadership institutions in collective action games," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 1(1), pages 100-113, July.
    8. Luigi Butera & John A. List, 2017. "An Economic Approach to Alleviate the Crises of Confidence in Science: With an Application to the Public Goods Game," NBER Working Papers 23335, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Lina Marcela Ramírez Leguizamón, 2019. "The paradox of equality policies and meritocracy in female leadership," Documentos CEDE 17371, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
    10. Philip J. Grossman & Mana Komai & James E. Jensen, 2015. "Leadership and gender in groups: An experiment," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 48(1), pages 368-388, February.
    11. Komai, Mana & Grossman, Philip J., 2009. "Leadership and group size: An experiment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 105(1), pages 20-22, October.
    12. Mana Komai & Philip J. Grossman & Evelyne Benie, 2017. "Leadership and the effective choice of information regime," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 82(1), pages 117-129, January.

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