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The paradox of policy analysis: If it is not used, why do we produce so much of it?

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  • Nancy Shulock

    (California State University, Sacramento)

Abstract

This article explores the apparent paradox that our society invests heavily in policy analysis when empirical studies, political science theory, and common wisdom all suggest that analysis is not used by policymakers to make better policy decisions. It offers a critique of the traditional view of policy analysis and presents an alternative view derived from contemporary literature on the policy process and decisionmaking. The alternative view suggests that there are legitimate uses for analysis other than the problem-solving use originally envisioned but apparently rarely attained. The two views imply different patterns of use of analysis by legislative committees-a contrast that I subject to an empirical test. An examination of quantitative data on policy analysis use by congressional committees from 1985 to 1994 lends support for the alternative view. The research has two implications. First, despite its scientific origins, policy analysis may be a more effective instrument of the democratic process than of the problem-solving process. Second, the profession of policy analysis may be in better shape than many who are calling for fundamental changes to its practice seem to believe. © 1999 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.

Suggested Citation

  • Nancy Shulock, 1999. "The paradox of policy analysis: If it is not used, why do we produce so much of it?," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 18(2), pages 226-244.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:jpamgt:v:18:y:1999:i:2:p:226-244
    DOI: 10.1002/(SICI)1520-6688(199921)18:2<226::AID-PAM2>3.0.CO;2-J
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Carol H. Weiss, 1989. "Congressional committees as users of analysis," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 8(3), pages 411-431.
    2. Dan Durning, 1993. "Participatory policy analysis in a social service agency: A case study," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 12(2), pages 297-322.
    3. Shepsle, Kenneth A. & Weingast, Barry R., 1987. "The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 81(1), pages 85-104, March.
    4. David J. Webber, 1984. "Political Conditions Motivating Legislators' Use Of Policy Information," Review of Policy Research, Policy Studies Organization, vol. 4(1), pages 110-118, August.
    5. William H. Robinson, 1989. "Symposium: Policy analysis for congress. Policy analysis for congress: Lengthening the time horizon," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 8(1), pages 1-9.
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