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The Effect of Judicial Expedience on Attorney Fees in Class Actions

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  • Eric Helland
  • Jonathan Klick

Abstract

Judges facing exogenous constraints on their pecuniary income have an incentive to reduce their workload to increase their private welfare. In the face of an increase in caseload, this incentive will induce judges to attempt to terminate some cases more rapidly. In class action cases, failing to grant an attorney fee request will delay termination. This conflict is likely to lead judges to authorize higher fees as court congestion increases. Using two data sets of class action settlements, we show that attorney fees are significantly and positively related to the congestion level of the court hearing the case.

Suggested Citation

  • Eric Helland & Jonathan Klick, 2007. "The Effect of Judicial Expedience on Attorney Fees in Class Actions," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(1), pages 171-187, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:36:y:2007:p:171-187
    DOI: 10.1086/508266
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Eric Helland & Jonathan Klick & Alexander Tabarrok, 2005. "Data Watch: Tort-uring the Data," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(2), pages 207-220, Spring.
    2. Beenstock, Michael & Haitovsky, Yoel, 2004. "Does the appointment of judges increase the output of the judiciary?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 351-369, September.
    3. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, 2004. "Attorney Fees in Class Action Settlements: An Empirical Study," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 1(1), pages 27-78, March.
    4. Lynk, William J, 1994. "The Courts and the Plaintiffs' Bar: Awarding the Attorney's Fee in Class-Action Litigation," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(1), pages 185-209, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Christoph Engel & Keren Weinshall, 2020. "Manna from Heaven for Judges: Judges’ Reaction to a Quasi‐Random Reduction in Caseload," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 17(4), pages 722-751, December.
    2. De Mot, Jef & Faure, Michael & Klick, Jonathan, 2015. "Appellate caseload and the switch to comparative negligence," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 147-156.
    3. Thomas Ulen, 2011. "An introduction to the law and economics of class action litigation," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 185-203, October.
    4. Tamar Kricheli‐Katz & Keren Weinshall, 2023. "Judging fast or slow: The effects of reduced caseloads on gender‐ and ethnic‐based disparities in case outcomes," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 20(4), pages 961-1004, December.
    5. Russell Smyth & Vinod Mishra, 2009. "The Publication Decisions of Judges on the County Court of Victoria," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 85(271), pages 462-471, December.
    6. Alon Klement & Keren Weinshall-Margel, 2016. "Cost-Benefit Analysis of Class Actions: An Israeli Perspective," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 172(1), pages 75-103, March.

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