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Bargaining with Informative Offers: An Analysis of Final-Offer Arbitration

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  • Farmer, Amy
  • Pecorino, Paul

Abstract

Final-offer arbitration is analyzed when parties are permitted to renegotiate after bids are submitted to the arbiter. If the failure to settle without arbitration arises owing to informational asymmetries, then the final-offer bids may communicate some of this private information. The informational content of the bids may act to encourage settlement after the bids have been submitted, though this outcome is not guaranteed. We find that a pooling equilibrium, under which all cases settle prior to arbitration, is less likely when there exists an opportunity for renegotiation. However, for parameter values in which there is no pooling equilibrium, the renegotiation stage strictly reduces the use of arbitration. The results may prove important in comparing settlement rates between final-offer arbitration and conventional arbitration. Copyright 1998 by the University of Chicago.

Suggested Citation

  • Farmer, Amy & Pecorino, Paul, 1998. "Bargaining with Informative Offers: An Analysis of Final-Offer Arbitration," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(2), pages 415-432, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:27:y:1998:i:2:p:415-32
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    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/468025
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    Cited by:

    1. Marselli, Riccardo & McCannon, Bryan C. & Vannini, Marco, 2015. "Bargaining in the shadow of arbitration," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 356-368.
    2. Eran Hanany & D. Marc Kilgour & Yigal Gerchak, 2007. "Final-Offer Arbitration and Risk Aversion in Bargaining," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 53(11), pages 1785-1792, November.
    3. Charness, Gary & Kuhn, Peter, 2011. "Lab Labor: What Can Labor Economists Learn from the Lab?," Handbook of Labor Economics, Elsevier.
    4. Farmer, Amy & Pecorino, Paul & Stango, Victor, 2004. "The Causes of Bargaining Failure: Evidence from Major League Baseball," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 47(2), pages 543-568, October.
    5. Wojciech Olszewski, 2011. "A Welfare Analysis of Arbitration," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 3(1), pages 174-213, February.
    6. Qiao, Yue, 2013. "Legal effort and optimal legal expenses insurance," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 179-189.

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