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Case-by-Case Adjudication and the Path of the Law

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  • Anthony Niblett

Abstract

This paper presents a model of judging, illustrating how case law evolves when two types of judges with different policy preferences decide cases narrowly. The model shows that case law is unlikely to reflect the midpoint of the judges' ideal points. The result challenges the conventional wisdom suggesting that balancing ideologically extreme judges will likely yield moderate laws. The model suggests that a centrist executive faced with a sitting extreme left-wing judge should appoint a moderate judge rather than an extreme right-wing judge.

Suggested Citation

  • Anthony Niblett, 2013. "Case-by-Case Adjudication and the Path of the Law," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(2), pages 303-330.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlstud:doi:10.1086/669716
    DOI: 10.1086/669716
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Niblett, Anthony, 2013. "Tracking inconsistent judicial behavior," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 9-20.
    2. Giacomo A. M. Ponzetto & Patricio A. Fernandez, 2008. "Case Law versus Statute Law: An Evolutionary Comparison," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 37(2), pages 379-430, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Nicola Gennaioli & Giacomo A. M. Ponzetto, 2015. "Optimally vague contracts and the law," Economics Working Papers 1410, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jan 2017.
    2. Justin Fox & Georg Vanberg, 2014. "Narrow versus broad judicial decisions," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 26(3), pages 355-383, July.
    3. Álvaro Bustos, 2020. "How Does Court Stability Affect Legal Stability?," Documentos de Trabajo 535, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
    4. Jacobi, Tonja & Kontorovich, Eugene, 2015. "Why judges always vote," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 190-199.

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