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Implementing a Market-Based Spectrum Policy

Listed author(s):
  • De Vany, Arthur
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    The spectrum auctions were a step toward the Herzel-Coase vision of a flexible and efficient market for spectrum. This article examines what remains to be done. Spectrum must be unbundled from broadcast and transmission facilities. The "commoditization" of spectrum will facilitate standardization, price discovery, and open access to diverse users. A liquid secondary spectrum market will lower transactions and entry cost, making telecommunications markets contestable. Auctions should be used to elicit a supply of spectrum from licensees as well as to allocate it to new users. In closing the spectrum commons, Congress granted use to a privileged few. Unbundled spectrum property rights, commoditization, and open markets will give the public access to this public resource. Copyright 1998 by the University of Chicago.

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    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/467406
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    Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Law & Economics.

    Volume (Year): 41 (1998)
    Issue (Month): 2 (October)
    Pages: 627-646

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    Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:v:41:y:1998:i:2:p:627-46
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JLE/

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    1. Cramton, Peter & Kwerel, Evan & Williams, John, 1998. "Efficient Relocation of Spectrum Incumbents," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(2), pages 647-675, October.
    2. R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, 1996. "Analyzing the Airwaves Auction," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(1), pages 159-175, Winter.
    3. Peter Cramton, 1997. "The FCC Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(3), pages 431-495, 09.
    4. Shelanski, Howard A & Huber, Peter W, 1998. "Administrative Creation of Property Rights to Radio Spectrum," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(2), pages 581-607, October.
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