Are Combination Gas and Electric Utilities Multiproduct Natural Monopolies?
Gas and electric services are provided in some locations by a single firm, in others by two firms. The loss of competition inherent in single-firm provision can be justified by the presence of both economies of scope and product-specific economies of scale for each output in multiproduct production. The estimation of a multiproduct, hybrid, translog cost function shows no evidence of such economies at the mean combination utility output vector. Copyright 1987 by MIT Press.
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Volume (Year): 69 (1987)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
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