Pests, Plagues, and Patents
The paper investigates the interaction between dynamic forms of incentive mechanisms (patent systems) and dynamic forms of problems (adaptations of pests and pathogens). Since biological problems recur, the design of the incentive mechanism must take into consideration: a) the need for investments into R&D that take into account the impermanence of the solution concepts; and b) the impact of this impermanence on the anticipated lifespan of any patent awarded for an innovation. The results indicate that patent systems must be carefully tailored to the nature of the problem under consideration. (JEL: C7, H0, H3, Q38) Copyright (c) 2003 The European Economic Association.
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Volume (Year): 1 (2003)
Issue (Month): 2-3 (04/05)
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