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Pay-as-you-speed An Economic Field Experiment

  • Lars Hultkrantz
  • Gunnar Lindberg

We report a vehicle-fleet experiment with an economic incentive for keeping within speed limits using a speed-alert device. A traffic insurance scheme was simulated for two months with a monthly bonus that was reduced by a non-linear speeding penalty. Participants were randomly assigned into four treatment and two control groups. A third control group consisted of drivers who had the device and were monitored, but did not participate. We found that participating drivers reduced severe speeding during the first month, but in the second, after having received feedback reports with an account of earned payments, only those given a penalty changed their behaviour. © 2011 LSE and the University of Bath

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Article provided by London School of Economics and University of Bath in its journal Journal of Transport Economics and Policy (JTEP).

Volume (Year): 45 (2011)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 415-436

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Handle: RePEc:tpe:jtecpo:v:45:y:2011:i:3:p:415-436
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.bath.ac.uk/e-journals/jtep

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  1. Shogren, Jason F. & Crocker, Thomas D., 1991. "Risk, self-protection, and ex ante economic value," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 1-15, January.
  2. DE DONDER, Philippe & HINDRIKS, Jean, 2006. "Does propitious selection explain why riskier people buy less insurance?," CORE Discussion Papers 2006032, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  3. De Meza, D. & Webb, D.C., 2000. "Advantageous Selection in Insurance Market," Discussion Papers 0007, Exeter University, Department of Economics.
  4. Gunnar Lindberg, 2001. "Traffic Insurance and Accident Externality Charges," Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, London School of Economics and University of Bath, vol. 35(3), pages 399-416, September.
  5. Hemenway, David, 1990. "Propitious Selection," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 105(4), pages 1063-69, November.
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