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Les déterminants économiques du vote aux élections présidentielles dans les pays de l’UEMOA

Author

Listed:
  • Abdoul Aziz NDIAYE

    (LARES, Université Gaston Berger de Saint-Louis, Sénégal)

  • Birane DIOUF

    (LARES, Université Gaston Berger de Saint-Louis, Sénégal)

  • Mamadou Abdoulaye KONTE

    (LARES, Université Gaston Berger de Saint-Louis, Sénégal)

Abstract

L'objectif de cet article est d’étudier les déterminants économiques du vote en Afrique subsaharienne lors d’élections présidentielles. En s’inspirant des travaux de Brender et Drazen (2008), nous cherchons à identifier les facteurs économiques explicatifs de la réélection ou non du président sortant dans la zone UEMOA entre 1990 et 2019, en pa-rallèle des déterminants sociopolitiques. Nos résultats montrent que le nombre de tours de l’élection, plus de libertés civiques, une hausse du taux de chômage et de la dette ont un impact négatif sur les chances de réélection du président sortant. Une augmentation de l’aide publique au développement et des investissements directs étrangers favorise les chances de réélection du président sortant.

Suggested Citation

  • Abdoul Aziz NDIAYE & Birane DIOUF & Mamadou Abdoulaye KONTE, 2022. "Les déterminants économiques du vote aux élections présidentielles dans les pays de l’UEMOA," Region et Developpement, Region et Developpement, LEAD, Universite du Sud - Toulon Var, vol. 56, pages 5-23.
    • Handle: RePEc:tou:journl:v:56:y:2022:p:5-23
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Déterminants économiques du vote ; Réélection du Président sortant ; UEMOA ; Données de panel ; Modèle Probit;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C23 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government

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