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Ruth, anthony, and clarence

Author

Listed:
  • Ely, Jeffrey C.

    (Department of Economics, Northwestern University)

Abstract

Non-partisan voters can become polarized not because of ideology but because it is optimal for them to remain uninformed and cancel out the votes of uninformed voters on “the other side.” Indeed, when stuck in such a state of polarization it is socially optimal to do so. Dynamics can lead an otherwise well-functioning assem- bly into irreversible polarization. Reputation effects might only make things worse.

Suggested Citation

  • Ely, Jeffrey C., 0. "Ruth, anthony, and clarence," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
    • Handle: RePEc:the:publsh:6224
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Fudenberg, Drew & Romanyuk, Gleb & Strack, Philipp, 2017. "Active learning with a misspecified prior," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(3), September.
    2. Ignacio Esponda & Demian Pouzo, 2016. "Berk–Nash Equilibrium: A Framework for Modeling Agents With Misspecified Models," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 84, pages 1093-1130, May.
    3. Renee Bowen & Danil Dmitriev & Simone Galperti, 2021. "Learning from Shared News: When Abundant Information Leads to Belief Polarization," NBER Working Papers 28465, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Bowen, T. Renee & Galperti, Simone & Dmitriev, Danil, 2021. "Learning from Shared News: When Abundant Information Leads to Belief Polarization," CEPR Discussion Papers 15789, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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    • D0 - Microeconomics - - General

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