'Testing' game theory
This paper considers whether game theory can be tested, what difficulties experimenters face in testing it, and what can be learned from attempts to test it. I emphasize that tests of game theory rely on fallible assumptions concerning particular features of the strategic situation and of the players. These do not render game theory untestable in principle, but they create serious problems. In coping with these problems, experimenters may use game theory to learn what games experimental subjects are playing.
Volume (Year): 12 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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- Hausman,Daniel M., 1992. "The Inexact and Separate Science of Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521425230.
- Andreoni, James, 1995.
"Cooperation in Public-Goods Experiments: Kindness or Confusion?,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 85(4), pages 891-904, September.
- Andreoni, J., 1993. "Cooperation in Public Goods Experiments: Kindness or Confusion?," Working papers 9309, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Hausman,Daniel M., 1992. "The Inexact and Separate Science of Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521415019.
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