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European defence: The cost of partial integration


  • Marc Guyot
  • Radu Vranceanu


In the last decade, European defence has undergone impressive changes. Military alliances between EU member countries have strengthened, and a European defence industrial base is building up. But in a paradoxical way, European countries look less capable of coping with important military crises, and their defence budgets are plunging. This paper proposes an explanation for this changing configuration, considering the case of the decentralized production of a public good with cross-border spillin effects. In this context, increased reliability on allies may lead one country to lower defence expenditures and supply. Citizens would welcome an increase in defence production, but this outcome might be achieved only by a centralized production of defence services. A temporary pragmatic solution would consist in assigning appropriate minimum defence spending targets to EU member countries.

Suggested Citation

  • Marc Guyot & Radu Vranceanu, 2001. "European defence: The cost of partial integration," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(2), pages 157-174.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:defpea:v:12:y:2001:i:2:p:157-174 DOI: 10.1080/10430710108404982

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    Cited by:

    1. Kollias, Christos & Manolas, George & Paleologou, Suzanna-Maria, 2004. "Defence expenditure and economic growth in the European Union: A causality analysis," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 26(5), pages 553-569, July.
    2. Martial Foucault, 2006. "Europe de la Défense. Quel processus d'allocation ?," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 57(3), pages 407-417.
    3. Martial Foucault, 2006. "Europe de la Défense: Quel processus d’allocation ?," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/fvtnkmt15tl, Sciences Po.
    4. Martial Foucault, 2005. "Biens publics et défense européenne : quel processus d'allocation ?," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques j05082, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
    5. Besancenot, Damien & Vranceanu, Radu, 2005. "Le financement public du secteur de la défense, une source d'inefficacité," ESSEC Working Papers DR 05008, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School.
    6. Damien Besancenot & Radu Vranceanu, 2006. "European Defence Firms: The Information Barrier On Private Finance," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 17(1), pages 23-36.
    7. Keith Hartley, 2003. "The future of European defence policy: An economic perspective," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 14(2), pages 107-115.

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    European Union; Defence; Public good; Spillin effect;


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