IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/sochwe/v62y2024i3d10.1007_s00355-024-01510-9.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Dorm augmented college assignments

Author

Listed:
  • Mustafa Oǧuz Afacan

    (Qatar University)

Abstract

In college assignments, a common practice is that students receive their dorm allocation after the realization of college placements. This causes wasted resources and unfair allocation. To fix this, we consider a college assignment problem where students simultaneously receive their college and dorm assignments. We first introduce the so-called “Dorm Augmented Deferred Acceptance” (DDA) and show that it is stable and efficient. However, it is not student-optimal stable. We then introduce our next mechanism, “Student-Improving Dorm Augmented Deferred Acceptance” (SDDA). It is mainly built on DDA, but with some extra steps to neutralize the student-harming rejection cycles. We show that SDDA is student-optimal stable, efficient, and unanimously preferred to DDA by students. Stability and strategy-proofness are incompatible, implying that neither of these mechanisms is strategy-proof. None of these mechanisms is more manipulable than the other; hence SDDA improves the students’ welfare without an extra strategic cost.

Suggested Citation

  • Mustafa Oǧuz Afacan, 2024. "Dorm augmented college assignments," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 62(3), pages 609-627, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:62:y:2024:i:3:d:10.1007_s00355-024-01510-9
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-024-01510-9
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00355-024-01510-9
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s00355-024-01510-9?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Battal Doğan & Lars Ehlers, 2022. "Robust Minimal Instability of the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(4), pages 556-582, November.
    2. Atila Abdulkadiroğlu & Yeon-Koo Che & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth & Olivier Tercieux, 2020. "Efficiency, Justified Envy, and Incentives in Priority-Based Matching," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, vol. 2(4), pages 425-442, December.
    3. Abizada, Azar, 2016. "Stability and incentives for college admissions with budget constraints," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(2), May.
    4. Parag A. Pathak & Tayfun Sönmez, 2013. "School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mechanisms by Their Vulnerability to Manipulation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(1), pages 80-106, February.
    5. Dur, Umut & Gitmez, A. Arda & Yılmaz, Özgür, 2019. "School choice under partial fairness," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(4), November.
    6. John William Hatfield & Paul R. Milgrom, 2005. "Matching with Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 913-935, September.
    7. Dogan, Battal & Ehlers, Lars, 2021. "Minimally unstable Pareto improvements over deferred acceptance," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 16(4), November.
    8. Tayfun Sönmez & Tobias B. Switzer, 2013. "Matching With (Branch‐of‐Choice) Contracts at the United States Military Academy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(2), pages 451-488, March.
    9. Roth, Alvin E., 1985. "The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 277-288, August.
    10. Onur Kesten, 2010. "School Choice with Consent," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 125(3), pages 1297-1348.
    11. Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz, 2019. "School choice with vouchers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 57-72.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Rodríguez-Álvarez, Carmelo & Romero-Medina, Antonio, 2024. "School choice with transferable student characteristics," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 103-124.
    2. Mustafa Oğuz Afacan & Umut Dur, 2023. "Strategy‐proof size improvement: is it possible?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 125(2), pages 321-338, April.
    3. Abdulkadiroglu, Atila & Andersson, Tommy, 2022. "School Choice," Working Papers 2022:4, Lund University, Department of Economics.
    4. Ata Atay & Ana Mauleon & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 2022. "Limited farsightedness in priority-based matching," UB School of Economics Working Papers 2022/438, University of Barcelona School of Economics.
    5. Zhang, Luosai, 2025. "The properness of weak stability notions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 247(C).
    6. Umut M. Dur & Scott Duke Kominers & Parag A. Pathak & Tayfun Sönmez, 2013. "The Demise of Walk Zones in Boston: Priorities vs. Precedence in School Choice," NBER Working Papers 18981, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Yao Cheng & Zaifu Yang, 2023. "Stable Matching Mechanisms under Distributional Constraints," Discussion Papers 23/05, Department of Economics, University of York.
    8. Tayfun Sönmez, 2013. "Bidding for Army Career Specialties: Improving the ROTC Branching Mechanism," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 121(1), pages 186-219.
    9. Hirata, Daisuke & Kasuya, Yusuke, 2017. "On stable and strategy-proof rules in matching markets with contracts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 27-43.
    10. Ortega, Josué & Klein, Thilo, 2023. "The cost of strategy-proofness in school choice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 515-528.
    11. Atay, Ata & Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent, 2025. "School choice with farsighted students," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 148-163.
    12. Yao Cheng & Zaifu Yang, "undated". "Stable Matching Mechanisms under Distributional Constraints," Discussion Papers 23/03, Department of Economics, University of York.
    13. Romm, Assaf & Roth, Alvin E. & Shorrer, Ran I., 2024. "Stability vs. no justified envy," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 148(C), pages 357-366.
    14. Benoit Decerf & Guillaume Haeringer & Martin Van der Linden, 2024. "Incontestable Assignments," Papers 2401.03598, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2024.
    15. Scott Duke Kominers & Alexander Teytelboym & Vincent P Crawford, 2017. "An invitation to market design," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 33(4), pages 541-571.
    16. Onur Kesten, 2012. "On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 51(3), pages 677-693, November.
    17. Avataneo, Michelle & Turhan, Bertan, 2021. "Slot-specific priorities with capacity transfers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 536-548.
    18. Imamura, Kenzo & Kawase, Yasushi, 2024. "Efficient matching under general constraints," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 197-207.
    19. Troyan, Peter & Delacrétaz, David & Kloosterman, Andrew, 2020. "Essentially stable matchings," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 370-390.
    20. Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz, 2020. "Graduate admission with financial support," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 114-127.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:62:y:2024:i:3:d:10.1007_s00355-024-01510-9. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.