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Kapitalmarktkonforme Unternehmensführung: Eine Analyse im Lichte der jüngeren Strategieprozesslehre

Author

Listed:
  • Alexander T. Nicolai

    (Lehrstuhls für Betriebswirtschaftslehre, insb. Management kleiner und mittlerer Unternehmen)

  • Thomas W. Thomas

    (Private Universität Witten/Herdeckew)

Abstract

Summary This article examines recent developments that cause an increasingly tight coupling between the capital markets and top management decision-making. As a consequence, a so-called capital marked-oriented type of strategy development is gaining ground. This type is characterised by a CEO-focus, a rational planning process, and the idea of generic strategies. Recent research on the strategy process disputes the descriptive and prescriptive validity of this concept. In this view it becomes evident that the tight coupling is connected to strategy issues that go beyond the agency-problem. One of the shortcomings of the agency perspective is the neglect of the entrepreneurial content of the strategy process.

Suggested Citation

  • Alexander T. Nicolai & Thomas W. Thomas, 2004. "Kapitalmarktkonforme Unternehmensführung: Eine Analyse im Lichte der jüngeren Strategieprozesslehre," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 56(5), pages 452-469, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sjobre:v:56:y:2004:i:5:d:10.1007_bf03372745
    DOI: 10.1007/BF03372745
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    G34; L20; M10;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General
    • M10 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - General

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