Innovation contests with temporary and endogenous monopoly rents
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Hillman, A L, 1984. "Producer and Consumer Interests, the State-Owned Pipeline, and Public Authority Pricing of Natural Gas," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 60(168), pages 28-33, March.
- Motta,Massimo, 2004. "Competition Policy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521016919, May.
- Yeon-Koo Che & Ian Gale, 2003.
"Optimal Design of Research Contests,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 646-671, June.
- Yeon-Koo Che & Ian Gale, 2000. "Optimal Design of Research Contests," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1784, Econometric Society.
- Richard L. Fullerton & R. Preston McAfee, 1999. "Auctioning Entry into Tournaments," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(3), pages 573-605, June.
- Mueller,Dennis C., 2003. "Public Choice III," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521894753, May.
- Appelbaum, Elie & Katz, Eliakim, 1987. "Seeking Rents by Setting Rents: The Political Economy of Rent Seeking," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 97(387), pages 685-699, September.
- Tuomas Takalo, 2001. "On the optimal patent policy," Finnish Economic Papers, Finnish Economic Association, vol. 14(1), pages 33-40, Spring.
- Dixit, Avinash K, 1986. "Comparative Statics for Oligopoly," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 27(1), pages 107-122, February.
- Stanley M. Besen & Joseph Farrell, 1994. "Choosing How to Compete: Strategies and Tactics in Standardization," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 8(2), pages 117-131, Spring.
More about this item
KeywordsContests; R&D; Innovation tournament; Mechanism design; D02; D20; D42; D78; L10; O31;
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
- D20 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - General
- D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General
- O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:12:y:2008:i:3:p:189-208. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Rebekah McClure). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .