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Innovation contests with temporary and endogenous monopoly rents

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  • Frederik Schmidt

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  • Frederik Schmidt, 2008. "Innovation contests with temporary and endogenous monopoly rents," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 12(3), pages 189-208, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:12:y:2008:i:3:p:189-208
    DOI: 10.1007/s10058-008-0047-6
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    5. Elie Appelbaum & Eliakim Katz, 2008. "Seeking Rents by Setting Rents: The Political Economy of Rent Seeking," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Arye L. Hillman & Kai A. Konrad (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1, pages 555-569, Springer.
    6. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1991. "The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 106(4), pages 1089-1127.
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    8. Yeon-Koo Che & Ian Gale, 2003. "Optimal Design of Research Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 646-671, June.
    9. Richard Allard, 1988. "Rent-seeking with non-identical players," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 57(1), pages 3-14, April.
    10. Richard L. Fullerton & R. Preston McAfee, 1999. "Auctioning Entry into Tournaments," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(3), pages 573-605, June.
    11. A. L. Hillman, 1984. "Producer and Consumer Interests, the State‐Owned Pipeline, and Public Authority Pricing of Natural Gas," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 60(1), pages 28-33, March.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Contests; R&D; Innovation tournament; Mechanism design; D02; D20; D42; D78; L10; O31;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D20 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - General
    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives

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