Innovation contests with temporary and endogenous monopoly rents
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
KeywordsContests; R&D; Innovation tournament; Mechanism design; D02; D20; D42; D78; L10; O31;
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
- D20 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - General
- D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General
- O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
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