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Noncompliance with SEC regulations: evidence from timely loan disclosures

Author

Listed:
  • Judson Caskey

    (UCLA Anderson School of Management)

  • Kanyuan Huang

    (UCLA Anderson School of Management)

  • Daniel Saavedra

    (UCLA Anderson School of Management)

Abstract

We use required 8-K filings around major borrowings to shed light on firms’ choices of whether to comply with SEC disclosure rules. Exploiting within-firm variation, we find that firms are more likely to hide loans with high spreads and tight financial covenants. We further find that firms appear to exploit the ambiguity of the definition of materiality, as they are more likely to selectively disclose (hide) “immaterial” loans when interest rates are low (high). Firms are less likely to hide loans when investors anticipate borrowing during asset acquisition, when firms are followed by more equity analysts or receive more investor attention, and when the firms’ stock prices are more volatile. Lastly, we provide evidence that the SEC does not rigorously enforce compliance with 8-K loan disclosures.

Suggested Citation

  • Judson Caskey & Kanyuan Huang & Daniel Saavedra, 2023. "Noncompliance with SEC regulations: evidence from timely loan disclosures," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 126-163, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:reaccs:v:28:y:2023:i:1:d:10.1007_s11142-021-09638-0
    DOI: 10.1007/s11142-021-09638-0
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Daniel Saavedra, 2023. "Do firms follow the SEC’s confidential treatment protocols? Evidence from credit agreements," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 1388-1412, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Disclosure; Bank loans; SEC monitoring; Form 8-K; Materiality;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
    • H32 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Firm

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