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Two-Person Second-Order Games, Part 2: Restructuring Operations to Reach a Win-Win Profile

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  • M. Larbani

    (Kainan University
    IIUM University)

  • P. L. Yu

    (National Chiao Tung University
    University of Kansas)

Abstract

In Part 1 of the paper, using habitual domains theory and finite Markov chain theory, we have introduced a new model for describing the evolution of the states of mind of players over time, the two-person second-order game. The concepts of focal mind profile as well as the solution concept of win-win mind profile have been introduced as solution concepts for these games. In Part 2 of the paper, we address the problem of restructuring a game where the focal profile (1,1) is not reachable or is not a win-win profile into a game where the profile (1,1) is a reachable win-win profile. Precisely, under some reasonable assumptions, we derive the possibility theorem that it is always possible to reach a win-win mind profile in a two-person second-order game. Moreover, we provide practical operations for restructuring games for reaching a win-win profile.

Suggested Citation

  • M. Larbani & P. L. Yu, 2009. "Two-Person Second-Order Games, Part 2: Restructuring Operations to Reach a Win-Win Profile," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 141(3), pages 641-659, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:joptap:v:141:y:2009:i:3:d:10.1007_s10957-008-9488-x
    DOI: 10.1007/s10957-008-9488-x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), 2002. "Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 3, number 3.
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    Cited by:

    1. Po-Lung Yu & Yen-Chu Chen, 2012. "Dynamic multiple criteria decision making in changeable spaces: from habitual domains to innovation dynamics," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 197(1), pages 201-220, August.
    2. M. Larbani & P. L. Yu, 2011. "n-Person Second-Order Games: A Paradigm Shift in Game Theory," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 149(3), pages 447-473, June.
    3. T. Q. Bao & B. S. Mordukhovich & A. Soubeyran, 2015. "Variational Analysis in Psychological Modeling," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 164(1), pages 290-315, January.
    4. Moussa Larbani & Po Lung Yu, 2012. "Decision Making and Optimization in Changeable Spaces, a New Paradigm," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 155(3), pages 727-761, December.

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