Uncoupled automata and pure Nash equilibria
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- Heinrich Nax, 2015. "Equity dynamics in bargaining without information exchange," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 25(5), pages 1011-1026, November.
- Babichenko, Yakov, 2012. "Completely uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 1-14.
- Nax, Heinrich H., 2015. "Equity dynamics in bargaining without information exchange," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 65426, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Burkhard Schipper, 2015. "Strategic teaching and learning in games," Working Papers 151, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
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KeywordsAutomaton; Nash equilibrium; Uncoupledness;
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