-Consistent equilibrium in repeated games
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- Mailath, George J. & Postlewaite, Andrew & Samuelson, Larry, 2005.
"Contemporaneous perfect epsilon-equilibria,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 126-140, October.
- Mailath,G.J. & Postlewaite,A. & Samuelson,L., 2002. "Contemporaneous perfect Epsilon-equilibria," Working papers 5, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- George Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson, 2003. "Contemporaneous Perfect Epsilon-Equilibria," PIER Working Paper Archive 03-021, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- Thomas Norman, 2012. "Almost-Rational Learning of Nash Equilibrium without Absolute Continuity," Economics Series Working Papers 602, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- John H. Nachbar, 2005. "Beliefs in Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(2), pages 459-480, March.
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