-Consistent equilibrium in repeated games
We introduce the concept of -consistent equilibrium where each player plays a -best response after every history reached with positive probability. In particular, an -consistent equilibrium induces an -equilibrium in any subgame reached along the play path. The existence of -consistent equilibrium is examined in various repeated games. The main result is the existence in stochastic games with absorbing states.
Volume (Year): 27 (1998)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
|Note:||Received January 1995/Revised version October 1996/Final version September 1997|
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