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On the limit points of an infinitely repeated rational expectations equilibrium

Author

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  • Marialaura Pesce

    (Università di Napoli “Federico II”
    Universitá di Napoli “Federico II”, Complesso Universitario Monte Sant’Angelo Via Cintia)

  • Niccolò Urbinati

    (Università di Napoli “Federico II”)

  • Nicholas C. Yannelis

    (The University of Iowa)

Abstract

We study the rational expectations equilibrium (REE) in the framework of a repeated economy. In each repetition agents observe the sequence of asymmetric REE’s occurred in the past to update their private information. We show that, in the limit, agents reach a symmetric information REE which exists universally (and not generically) and it is Pareto efficient and obviously incentive compatible. We also prove the converse result, i.e., given a symmetric information REE, we can construct a sequence of approximate asymmetric REE allocations that converges to the symmetric information REE. In view of the above results, the symmetric information REE provides a rationalization for the asymmetric one.

Suggested Citation

  • Marialaura Pesce & Niccolò Urbinati & Nicholas C. Yannelis, 2025. "On the limit points of an infinitely repeated rational expectations equilibrium," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 80(2), pages 465-492, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:80:y:2025:i:2:d:10.1007_s00199-024-01576-7
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-024-01576-7
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Dionysius Glycopantis & Allan Muir & Nicholas Yannelis, 2009. "On non-revealing rational expectations equilibrium," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 38(2), pages 351-369, February.
    2. Kreps, David M., 1977. "A note on "fulfilled expectations" equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 32-43, February.
    3. Luciano I. Castro & Marialaura Pesce & Nicholas C. Yannelis, 2020. "A new approach to the rational expectations equilibrium: existence, optimality and incentive compatibility," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 1-61, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Enrique Urbano Arellano & Xinyang Wang, 2023. "Social Learning of General Rules," Papers 2310.15861, arXiv.org.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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