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The spatially dominant equilibrium of a game

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  • J. Hofbauer

Abstract

A new framework for equilibrium selection is presented. Playing games recurrently inspace and time may render one of the equilibria “spatially dominant”. Prevailing initially ona large enough finite part of the space, it will take over on the whole space in the long run.In particular it will drive out the other equilibria along travelling waves. This new dominanceconcept is compared with the Harsanyi‐Selten risk‐dominance concept. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1999

Suggested Citation

  • J. Hofbauer, 1999. "The spatially dominant equilibrium of a game," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 89(0), pages 233-251, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:annopr:v:89:y:1999:i:0:p:233-251:10.1023/a:1018979708014
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1018979708014
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    Cited by:

    1. Jun Honda, 2018. "Games with the total bandwagon property meet the Quint–Shubik conjecture," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 47(3), pages 893-912, September.
    2. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2000. "Global Games: Theory and Applications," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1275, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    3. Kojima, Fuhito & Takahashi, Satoru, 2008. "p-Dominance and perfect foresight dynamics," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 67(3-4), pages 689-701, September.
    4. Honda, Jun, 2015. "Games with the Total Bandwagon Property," Department of Economics Working Paper Series 197, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business.
    5. , & , & ,, 2008. "Monotone methods for equilibrium selection under perfect foresight dynamics," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 3(2), June.
    6. Boyu Zhang & Josef Hofbauer, 2015. "Equilibrium selection via replicator dynamics in $$2 \times 2$$ 2 × 2 coordination games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(2), pages 433-448, May.
    7. Zhang, Boyu, 2016. "Quantal response methods for equilibrium selection in normal form games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 113-123.
    8. Tatsuya Sasaki, 2014. "The Evolution of Cooperation Through Institutional Incentives and Optional Participation," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 4(3), pages 345-362, September.
    9. Daisuke Oyama & Satoru Takahashi & Josef Hofbauer, 2011. "Perfect foresight dynamics in binary supermodular games," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 7(3), pages 251-267, September.
    10. , & , H. & ,, 2015. "Sampling best response dynamics and deterministic equilibrium selection," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(1), January.
    11. Jun Honda, 2015. "Games with the Total Bandwagon Property," Department of Economics Working Papers wuwp197, Vienna University of Economics and Business, Department of Economics.

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